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How Things Feel





This essay is an intellectual history, one of affect theory both within and without bibli-
cal studies, rendered as an ecology of thought. It is an “archive of feelings,” a series of 
thematic portraits, and a description of the landscape of the field of biblical studies 
through a set of frictions and express discontentments with its legacies, as well as a set 
of meaningful encounters under its auspices. That landscape is recounted with a fully 
experiential map, intentionally relativizing those more dominant sources and tradi-
tional modes of doing intellectual history. Affect theory and biblical studies, it turns 
out, both might be described as implicitly, and ambivalently, theological. But biblical 
studies has not only typically refused explicit theologizing, it has also refused explicit 
affectivity, and so affect theory presents biblical studies with both its own losses and 
new and vital possibilities. 
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 Introduction
To be invited to write for a publication called Research Perspectives in Biblical 
Interpretation, first of all, seems to me to be a rather happily exploitable oppor-
tunity. The words “research perspectives” encapsulate what is probably my 
favorite, abiding (and deeply productive) tension in the field of biblical stud-
ies: that between the empirical and the subjective. 
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“Research” implies rigor, a certain air of being informed. It denotes due dili-
gence. “Perspective,” however, leaves (at least) a slip of room for most modern 
disciplines’ ball and chain: that necessarily evil, and occasional axis of inspira-
tion, “the personal.” I can’t decide if offering a “research perspective” on affect 
theory—most succinctly described as social theories of emotion, or theories on 
the “force of encounter” (Gregg and Seigworth 2010: 2)—is more ironic or apt, 
since affect theory’s main motivations have been not only to submit that cat-
egory of experience we call “feeling” into critical consideration, but to notice 
how thoroughly and unavoidably “feeling” is part of our critical considerations. 
My “research perspective” on affect theory, then, is that any intellectual his-
tory, let alone one centering on affect, will have to be something more—more 
complicated, more satisfying—than a genealogy of ideas or a tracking of pub-
lications, not least because any academic knows that what gets committed 
to print and when is only a fraction of the story. It will have to account for a 
wider ecology of contexts, most significantly felt contexts, which have given 
shape and texture to affect theory’s ongoing moment within and around bibli-
cal studies. Affect’s relationship to psychoanalysis and the somatic reminds 
us that the “facts” or most relevant details of any intellectual history not only 
exceed what gets committed to paper, but actually might reside elsewhere as 
well: the indefinite electricity of interpersonal moments; the temperature or 
mood of any given room; the hyper-particular situation in which something is 
said or the way in which something unfolds; the historical and cultural force 
fields and unconscious desires that coalesce people, give ideas traction, or 
sweep possibilities away.1 
I should note (or, rather, I want to note) that my curiosity and then devo-
tion for affect theory happened over the course of my professionalization as a 
scholar. It is therefore impossible to untangle from my deepening investment 
in not just biblical studies and the disciplines touching it, but the institutions in 
which I logged time and, most significantly, my personal associations. To put it 
more pointedly, I won’t attempt to separate my professional, institutional, and 
1   At the time I began writing this piece, I was reading Adam Phillips’ biography of Freud, in 
which he performs a Freudian reading of Freud’s own life, including making recourse to 
Freud’s suspicion of the genre of biography. Regarding the “facts” of personal history, Phillips 
writes, “The facts of a life—and indeed the facts of life—were among the many things that 
Freud’s work has changed our way of thinking about. Freud’s work shows us not merely that 
nothing in our lives is self-evident, that not even the facts of our lives speak for themselves; 
but that facts themselves look different from a psychoanalytic point of view” (2016: 4). As 
it will become clear as this essay proceeds, though, my approach is additionally (and quite 
heavily) influenced by feminist historiography, asking after those things that might have 
been left out, covered over, or ignored by traditional histories.
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relational histories from this account of affect theory within biblical studies, 
not only because to do so would deprive this essay of any kind of meaningful 
“perspective,” but because we are more or less starved for models of intellectual 
history that do justice to the fully relational ways in which thoughts unfold, the 
way disciplines and institutions enable and constrain, and the incidental and 
sometimes circular fashion in which insights pop up. 
This essay is thus an attempt to do an intellectual history as an ecology 
of thought. It is an “archive of feelings,” a series of thematic portraits, and a 
description of the landscape of the field of biblical studies through a set of fric-
tions and express discontentments with its legacies, as well as a set of mean-
ingful encounters under its auspices.2 That landscape is recounted with a fully 
experiential map, one drawn with as much capacity for precision and self-rela-
tivizing as I can muster, and one that also intentionally relativizes those more 
dominant sources and traditional modes of recounting intellectual history. 
I’ll characterize affect theory outside of biblical studies, of course, but mostly 
through its relevance to biblical studies—connections made, and sometimes 
missed.
 Part 1: Intensity, Potentiality, and Epistemologies of Awe
“I wish to entertain the idea that the violent discourse of the text viscerally 
and affectively reorients readers with respect to the kind of power relations 
that produce violence,” Erin Runions writes in a response to a collection of 
essays on Jeremiah (2011b: 235). The title of her piece is “Prophetic Affect and 
the Promise of Change,” and she uses the work of Brian Massumi in Parables 
for the Virtual (2002) to offer a new angle on the ambivalence of prophetic lan-
guage and suggest that there may be more capacious ways for understanding 
that language than simply revenge or hope (still two of the most overused con-
cepts for considering the desires that coalesce around prophesy). “If affect is 
central to cultural and political reasoning, as cultural and queer theorists have 
recently been suggesting, then it is important to consider how cultural texts 
such as the Bible are purveyors of feelings and bodily responses that both sup-
port and subvert violent relations of subordination” (Runions 2011b: 237). 
In this piece, Runions carefully differentiates Massumi’s notion of affect, 
one indebted to Deleuze, from dominant understandings of emotion (Runions 
2011b: 238). Massumi describes affect as nonconscious, pre- or im-personal 
2   This is a concept coined by Ann Cvetkovich (2003), and one on which I will elaborate in what 
follows.
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sensation that operates below the level of representation—an anxiety-induc-
ing description for even casual cultural constructivists.3 Affect in the Deleuzian 
mode is intensity that operates—less for Massumi than for Deleuze—as 
almost pure possibility. In this way, it offers a way to liquify the solid ground 
upon which we pin and locate subjects, destabilizing the “grid” that theo-
ries of social construction since the linguistic turn have inadvertently stabi-
lized (Massumi 2002: 2–5). Affect allows for change at an ontological level.4 
“Massumi’s conceptualization of affect and the possibility for change opens up 
a way for thinking about the tension between violence and hope in Jeremiah 
and its afterlives,” Runions proposes (2011b: 239). 
If affect gestures to something like pure possibility, emotion, on the other 
hand, is a cognitive enclosing of affect, an apprehension that constrains affect’s 
true potentiality. As Runions writes, 
Many of these strong emotions about which these papers speak—dis-
gust, fear, shame, rage, revenge, terror, powerlessness, despair—‘capture’ 
affect. These are emotions that we imagine the poet to have been feeling 
or trying to provoke. We imagine it, perhaps, because that is what we feel 
when we read the text; which means that the text is affecting us. Perhaps 
these prophetic fantasies of violence produce a certain set of movements 
in our bodies—non-conscious, autonomic remainders of their significa-
tion. (2011b: 3) 
3   Massumi indeed positions himself as a response to cultural constructivisim, as broadly 
adapted from Michel Foucault and, especially, Judith Butler. As he writes in his introduction:
  The project of this book is to explore the implications for cultural theory of this simple 
conceptual displacement: body—(movement/sensation)—change. Cultural theory of the 
past two decades has tended to bracket the middle terms and their unmediated connec-
tion. It can be argued that in doing so it has significantly missed the two outside terms, even 
though they have been of consistent concern—perhaps the central concerns in the humani-
ties. Attention to the literality of movement was deflected by fears of falling into a “naïve 
realism,” a reductive empiricism that would dissolve the specificity of the cultural domain 
in the plain, seemingly unproblematic, “presence” of dumb matter. . . . But this thoroughly 
mediated body could only be a “discursive” body: one with its signifying gestures. Signifying 
gestures make sense. If properly “performed,” they may also unmake sense by scrambling 
significations already in place. Make and unmake sense as they might, they don’t sense” 
(2002: 1–2).
4   Seigworth and Gregg describe affect in the Deleuzian/Spinozist vein as the “yet-ness” of the 
body: “Cast forward by its open-ended-in-between-ness, affect is integral to a body’s perpet-
ual becoming (always becoming otherwise, however subtly, than what it already is), pulled 
beyond its seeming surface-boundedness by way of its relation to, indeed its composition 
through, the forces of encounter” (2010: 3).
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While the affectively powerful images in the text contain a kind of emotional 
coding—“Perhaps we instinctively flinch at the stripping of the monstrous 
female. That flinching congeals into the emotion the text also dictates—
shame” (Runions 2011b: 3)—there is inevitably something leftover, something 
more, something not containable that interferes with any predictable response. 
Runions suggests that “while prophetic language can be dangerously condu-
cive to emotions that authorize violence, misogyny and imperialism, it perhaps 
also opens up possibilities for reorienting emotional and bodily responses. The 
ambivalence of a prophetic text like Jeremiah creates openness to the con-
tradictory possibilities of affect, in ways that might move people and thought 
beyond the expected.” She concludes, “This new orientation of affect is some-
thing a little different than the teleological expectations of hope. It revels in 
ambivalence rather than reducing it. It is an ambiguous, unpredictable hope” 
(2011b: 242).
Although published in 2011, this paper (or an earlier version of it) was 
originally presented in 2008 at a panel on Jeremiah at the Society of Biblical 
Literature’s annual meeting.5 I hardly remember the papers themselves; I was 
there to see Erin, named to me by my then-doctoral advisor as a resource for 
doing gender theory in biblical studies. I had read her book Changing Subjects 
(2001),6 and had become a fan with that level of earnest ardor and dorky fawn-
ing so distinctly displayed by young academic newcomers (I was a first year 
doctoral student at Union Theological Seminary in New York City at the time). 
With understated delivery, and under the flat, vacuous lighting of a confer-
ence hotel ballroom, I remember her uttering the words “affect theory” with a 
list of names parenthetically attached: Massumi, Puar (2007), Ahmed (2004), 
Clough (2007). Or was the fourth name Sedgwick? In any case, I approached 
her nervously after the session, introduced myself, and gushed that I was read-
ing affect theory, too. I had just read Eve Sedgwick’s Touching Feeling (2003),7 
and I think I may have mentioned that it changed my life (it did). What did she 
5   Response to a session “Utopia, Hope, and the Fantasy of Violence in Jeremiah” at the annual 
meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, Boston, November 22–25, 2008.
6   Runions’s attraction to Massumi is prefigured in Changing Subjects (2001), since there too 
she is preoccupied with ambiguity and indeterminacy at both the textual and the subjective 
level.
7   I found Sedgwick’s book (and thus affect theory) simply by browsing the queer studies sec-
tion of an independent bookstore near Union and Columbia University. The photo on the 
front cover is of artist Judith Scott embracing a sculpture of her own that looks like a large 
wire-and-yarn cocoon or cyclone. It seemed so beautiful and funny then, and after a handful 
or so of years it still seems so perfect and full as a visual representation of what attending to 
affect means.
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think of Touching Feeling, I wanted to know? I don’t remember what she said, 
but I asked Erin for a copy of her response, which she generously gave to me: 
pen scribbles, impromptu adjustments, and all. I’ve lost that paper by now, but 
Massumi, Puar, Ahmed, and Clough became my new, if brief, bibliography. 
While Erin was probably the first in the field of biblical studies to bring 
affect theory up at all, and she is certainly the first to have published on it, 
it should be said that Virginia Burrus’s Saving Shame (2007) appeared a 
year before that SBL meeting. While not interested in or aware of “affect 
theory” as such just yet and not technically falling under “biblical studies,” 
Virginia’s Saving Shame borrows from Sedgwick’s discussions of shame in 
Touching Feeling—particularly the theatricality of shame and its relationship 
to identity performance (Sedgwick 2003: 35–64)—to theorize the spectacular 
self-exhibitions and transformations of shame in early Christian literature. 
Virginia I had also seen in person for the first time at an American Academy of 
Religion annual meeting; she was responding to Amy Hollywood’s latest book.8 
There, too, a crowd of us gathered for a discussion about gender and sexuality 
(and, oh yeah, Christianity) were easing our way, unbeknownst to us, into that 
murky territory of feeling: with her characteristically lyrical writing, accompa-
nied by a subtle, physical sway, Virginia held forth on the various virtues and/
or shortfalls (nothing of which I recall, save for the phrase “lesbian, but not 
yet queer”) of a book entitled Sensible Ecstasy (Hollywood 2001). Hollywood’s 
Sensible Ecstasy, like Saving Shame, thematizes affect without engaging much 
of the burgeoning “affect theory” (and doesn’t quite fit the narrow parameters 
of this biblical studies essay, either).9 Sensible Ecstasy follows so much theory 
within or emanating from French philosophy—George Bataille, Julia Kristeva, 
Luce Irigaray, Jacques Lacan, Judith Butler and others—and indeed many of 
these thinkers set the scene for affect theory within cultural studies and literary 
theory. For instance, not only is Powers of Horror (Kristeva 1982) a book length 
chronicle of disgust (see Ahmed 2004: 82–100), but Kristeva’s understanding 
of the semiotic (Kristeva 1980), a bodily/instinctive force operating below and 
beyond the level of language, is echoed in especially those theories of affect 
that seek to differentiate affect from the blunt linguistic instruments of desig-
nated emotion (e.g., Massumi 2002). Butler, like Sedgwick, had been theoriz-
8   Response to a book review panel on Amy Hollywood’s Sensible Ecstasy, organized by the 
Philosophy of Religion Section and Theology and Continental Philosophy Group at the 
annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion, Washington, D.C., November 18–21, 
2006.
9   Burrus’s does make recourse to “affect theory,” but the affect theory of Silvan Tomkins, rather 
than the broader and more recent work of Massumi et al. that now is implied by the term.
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ing (and, I think, simply creating space for) grief and loss around the cultural 
and psychological domains of gender and sexuality for decades before “affect” 
was a buzzword or widespread interest.10 As Kent Brintnall has observed, 
Bataille describes fascist political ideology and its resistance in affective terms 
(Brintnall 2015).11 And while Lacan’s work at large hardly seems interested in 
emotional/affective life,12 the heavy (and famed) emphasis on jouissance, theo-
rized by Irigaray and Kristeva, among scads of others, is part of what Sedgwick 
is pushing back against in her own turn to affect as a way of accounting for the 
intricate, and often humdrum, range of experience:
A disturbingly large amount of theory seems explicitly to undertake 
the proliferation of only one affect, or maybe two, of whatever kind—
whether ecstasy, sublimity, self-shattering, jouissance, suspicion, abjec-
tion, knowingness, horror, grim satisfaction, or righteous indignation. 
It’s like the old joke: “Comes the revolution, Comrade, everyone gets to 
eat roast beef every day.” “But Comrade, I don’t like roast beef.” “Comes 
the revolution, Comrade, you’ll like roast beef.” Comes, the revolution, 
Comrade, you’ll be tickled pink by those deconstructive jokes; you’ll faint 
from ennui every minute you’re not smashing the state apparatus; you’ll 
definitely want hot sex twenty to thirty times a day. You’ll be mournful 
and militant. You’ll never want to tell Deleuze and Guattari, “Not tonight, 
dears, I have a headache.” (Sedgwick 2003: 146)
Most histories of affect theory often find a genesis in two signal essays, both 
published in the same year: Sedgwick and Adam Frank’s “Shame in the 
Cybernetic Fold” (1995) and Brian Massumi’s “The Autonomy of Affect” (1995). 
This produces a genealogy in which Sedgwick, in her recourse to Melanie Klein 
and Sylvan Tomkins, holds down the “emotion” end of affect theory, while 
Massumi, in elaborating Gilles Deleuze’s work (which is in turn indebted to 
Baruch Spinoza), garrisons the “something more” and immanent potentiality 
10   Butler’s explicit interest in loss and grief (2004; 2009) is in continuity with her earlier work 
(e.g., 1997: 131–50). There are so many affective subtexts in other essays in Butler 1997 as 
well, despite Massumi’s polemical claim that Butlerian discursive bodies are not “sensing” 
bodies. This is perhaps what Michael Hardt is suggesting in offhandedly citing “feminist 
theory that focuses on the body” as a precursor to affect theory (2007: xii n. 1).
11   Brintnall summarizes that for Bataille, “[r]evolutionary and anti-fascist politics . . . depend 
on understanding the affective attractions of particular social formations” (2015: 1–2).
12   Pushing back against this general notion that Lacan’s psychological schematics make no 
recourse to or no room for affect is Shepherdson 2008. See also Soler 2015.
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of affect. I’m often surprised at how regularly and how strongly these two 
strands of affect theory are opposed to one another—and how limited this 
is as a genealogy. First, this genealogy manages to assume Massumi’s rheto-
ric, and erase affect theory’s connections to Butler, Kristeva, and others, as 
I’ve suggested above. Second, this narrative of affect theory’s ostensible two 
strands takes the astonishing combination of Tomkins and Klein in Sedgwick 
for granted,13 as if those two might be an obvious or natural pair of think-
ers for theorizing affect. Sedgwick uses both Klein and Tomkins in a highly 
contextualized fashion in order to relativize poststructuralist and Foucaultian 
epistemologies, as well as to aid in her own enthralling phenomenology of spe-
cific experiences (Sedgwick 2003: 123–51; 2011: 123–63). The anecdotal dimen-
sions and piecemeal theorizing of Sedgwick’s work on affect never gets quite 
enough due from my perspective, even while piecemeal (or “accretive”) pro-
cesses are themselves foregrounded in Sedgwick’s work (e.g., Sedgwick 2003: 
123–51; 2011: 69–122).
Finally, this strong narrative differentiation of Massumi and Sedgwick 
ignores the parallel impulses driving their respective interests in affect. Both 
Sedgwick and Massumi critique received theories of identity as constrictive, 
for instance, and express dissatisfaction with poststructuralist epistemologi-
cal assumptions, which seem to have stewed in their own juice for a little too 
long (e.g., Sedgwick 2003: 123–51; 2011: 69–122).14 Sedgwick tires of the incessant 
(paranoiac) unveiling of latent essentialisms (2003: 123–51), and Massumi is 
frustrated by theories of social “construction” that, almost ironically, imagine 
a frozen or solid subjectivity while still being anti-materialist (2002: 1–2). Both 
Massumi and Sedgwick additionally find themselves resisting dominant theo-
retical tendencies by borrowing from biological models or concepts. Perhaps 
more compelling yet is what Massumi and Sedgwick both express as an ani-
mating desire in their turn to affect: they both explicitly claim a desire to honor 
or recover senses of wonder, surprise, and pleasure in renderings of the world 
as a necessary part of the critical and theoretical endeavor.15 “So why not hang 
13   The surprise of putting Tompkins alongside Klein is in pairing the concerted biological 
and classificatory interests of Tompkins, who famously designated six, or occasionally 
nine, distinct affects grounded in the human biological constitution, with the dark drama 
of Kleinian mother-infant relations.
14   See also Sedgwick’s interest in the “middle ranges of agency” in Sedgwick 2003: 13–24.
15   In contrasting the paranoid and reparative positions, Sedgwick notices that paranoid 
knowing (exemplified by the hermeneutics of suspicion) is a strong theory that tries to 
account for all (terrible) possibilities as inevitable, and to forestall (painful) surprise. In 
so doing, it not only disavows its own affectivity, but leaves no room for the “heartbeat 
of contingency” that characterizes life in general, and queer readings in particular. She 
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up the academic hat of critical self-seriousness, set aside the intemperate arro-
gance of debunking—and enjoy?” Massumi opines (2002: 13).
A longing for a different theoretical disposition, a posture less cranky and 
grim (though no less unvarnished) than the one taken by the reigning post-
Foucaultian theories of subjectivity and language, while not universal to affect 
theory,16 is something of a persistent refrain, and wonder, enjoyment, and 
vitality/aliveness are the terms that seem most often circulate around that 
longing. “The ordinary,” Kathleen Stewart writes, “is a shifting assemblage of 
practices and practical knowledges, a scene of both liveness and exhaustion, 
a dream of escape or of the simple life . . . Ordinary affects are public feelings 
that begin and end in broad circulation, but they’re also the stuff seemingly 
intimate lives are made of. They give circuits and flows the form of a life” (2007: 
1–2). She opposes this to more structural or ideological analyses that leave sys-
tems “looking like dead effects imposed on an innocent world” (2007: 1). Yet 
another example: in Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (2010), Jane 
Bennett articulates her understanding of affect as a kind of capacity inherent 
to materiality (much more Spinozist than Massumi’s) as related to an almost 
child-like state of awe in which the world is imbued with aliveness.17 Sara 
Ahmed, too, claims wonder, and like Sedgwick, connects pain and wonder. 
However Ahmed proposes a return to wonder not as relief from intense dis-
illusionment as much as catalyst for it. Describing the way her encounter with 
feminism made her see the world anew, Ahmed writes:
highlights close reading and camp as reparative practices that have no more optimistic a 
picture of the world, but are more closely attuned to surprise, humor, and hope, “extract-
ing sustenance from the objects of a culture—even of a culture whose avowed desire has 
often been not to sustain them” (2003: 146–50). Massumi writes that the emphasis on 
“process before signification or coding . . . brings ‘wonder back’ ” into theories of significa-
tion and coding. “ ‘Miraculation’ should figure prominently into the semiotic vocabulary” 
(2002: 7).
16   A few examples of major titles about affect that aren’t specifically worried about particu-
larly grim postures would be Berlant 2011; Brennan 2004; and Puar 2007. It’s not that these 
books are “cranky,” obviously, but that affect in these books doesn’t get put to work to 
intervene in sinister macrotheories.
17   Bennett explains, for example, that her use of the term “Thing-Power perhaps has the rhe-
torical advantage of calling to mind a childhood sense of the world as filled with all sorts 
of animate beings, some human, some not, some organic, some not” (2010: 20). See also 
her recourse to childhood in 2010: vii or Bennett 2001, which expresses a resonant desire 
to reanimate the world.
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I felt like I was seeing the world for the first time, and that all that I took for 
granted as given—as a question of the way things are—had come to be 
over time, and was contingent. It is through wonder that pain and anger 
come to life, as wonder allows us to realise what hurts, and what causes 
pain, and what we feel is wrong, is not necessary, and can be unmade as 
well as made. Wonder energises the hope of transformation, and the will 
for politics. (2004: 181)
For Ahmed, wonder is about the hope for change; in Sedgwick, it is about an 
openness to surprise. In both cases, it is about the (painful) admission that 
things didn’t have to turn out the way that they did (Sedgwick 2003: 136–38). 
I don’t at all wish to reductively symptomize all of affect theory under the 
same sentiment, let alone one that resonates as romantic or, perhaps, as some 
kind of nostalgic desire for innocence (as wonder might very well do). But it 
does seem that if we take the genealogical histories of ideas, and more par-
ticularly the tight theoretical differentiations made by intellectuals them-
selves, too seriously, what we miss is the yearnings and losses that give rise to 
such theoretical phenomena in the first place. The history of ideas, of course, 
also heroizes individual thinkers for their innovations (which, frankly, I can’t 
say I’m entirely opposed to), but, again, at the cost of rendering the texture 
of the very landscape in which such ideas are generated. Indeed Bennett’s 
work, since it typically get filed under political philosophy or a trend termed 
“new materialism” rather than “affect theory,” suggests that we might under-
stand the turn to affect, however “affect” is defined, not as a theory or set of 
theories at all, but rather as a network of recurrent (and concurrent) impulses 
and interests. It seems a little blithe to simply notice the prevalence of, say, 
the Deleuzian “assemblage” in her work, connect it to Puar and Massumi, and 
move on. Instead or alongside of that observation, we might, for instance, con-
nect Bennett’s “new materialism,” which honors the agency of the ostensibly 
inanimate, with Sedgwick’s affective iteration of texture in which materials 
have a kind of agency in their intractability, impinging on us and our fanta-
sies of power.18 And while Massumi strongly differentiates his work from social 
18   Sedgwick, in contrasting her theoretical writing with her artistic work with textiles, 
writes:
   Yet how different it is to set to work with physical materials—especially for some-
body, like, me, who isn’t overendowed with either natural facility of acquired skills for 
fashioning images and objects. Melanie Klein argues that it can be a relief and relaxation, 
rather than a big tragedy the way it is in Freud, when one manages to get disabused of the 
fantasy of omnipotence, together with the reflex fantasy of utter impotence. One has at 
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theories of emotion (like that of Sara Ahmed), one might notice that Massumi’s 
interest in affective dynamics and feedback loops of media transmission isn’t 
all that far away from, say, Ahmed’s reading of certain kinds of nationalist or 
patriotic language as affective-political vehicle (Massumi 2002: 46–67; Ahmed 
2004: 71–80, 130–41).
There are more themes that seem to travel in affect’s sidecar: archive (e.g., 
Cvetkovich 2003; Stoler 2010), diaspora (e.g., Eng 2010; Axel 2002; Cho 2007; 
Puar 2007; Cvetkovich 2003),19 ruination (e.g., Stoler 2013; Navaro-Yashin 2009),20 
and posthumanism (e.g., Chen 2012; Weheliye 2014)21 are the four to which 
I’m most drawn, and the first three of these (sometimes all four) additionally 
foreground questions of nation-building, suggesting that “the affective turn” 
is not only driven by a certain longing for wonder, but a distinct set of aware-
ness about the micropolitics of national sovereignty as well. Ann Cvetkovich 
seeks to “disrupt celebratory accounts of the nation” with her archive of dia-
sporic, sexual, homophobic, and racial traumas (2003: 105). Sara Ahmed takes 
on not only the unrequited love of patriotism and the nationalist politics of 
shame, but the “promise of happiness” that entices national/citizen subjects 
to live normative lives (2010). Ann Laura Stoler attends to colonial anxieties 
and to the bonds of attachment within colonial relations (2002), and Judith 
Butler’s Frames of War (2009) specifically asks about the national stakes of 
what constitutes a life worth grieving. Both Jasbir Puar’s Terrorist Assemblages: 
Homonationalism in Queer Times (2007) and Erin Runions’s Babylon Complex 
(2014a) deal much more with questions of national sovereignty than affect, 
but nonetheless periodically situate their critiques of national sexual politics 
within affect’s theoretical frameworks. The notion of feelings as symptoms of 
cultural forces (Cvetkovich, Ahmed, Stoler) and that of transmission of poli-
tics through sensations in the body (Massumi, Stewart, Puar, Runions), are, of 
course, intervening in Cartesian fantasies of the self-contained and autonomous 
last the reassuring sense of a grounding in reality. I feel this wonderfully in my material 
practice, with the ways that paper, fabric, thread and other supplies press back so reliably, 
so palpably, against my efforts to shape them according to models I’ve conceived. In these 
circumstances perfectionism, for me, would make no sense at all, and the disturbing fan-
tasy of omnipotence has no opportunity to arise. Instead, there are second-by-second 
negotiations with the material properties of whatever I’m working on, and the questions 
“What will it let me do?” and “What does it want me to do?” are in constant three-way 
conversation with “What is it that I want to do?” (2011: 83).
19   I engage with nearly all of these texts in my own blending of affect and diaspora theories 
in Kotrosits 2015c.
20   In biblical studies, see Kotrosits 2015a.
21   Within biblical studies, see Koosed 2014a.
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subject. But in doing so, they additionally unbind the nationalist fantasies of 
political autonomy on and through which the Cartesian subject is imagined. 
The nation concretizes itself not as boundary as much as collection of forces, 
even while the national body appears soft and hopelessly diffuse. 
The recourse to wonder, awe, or even—as in Runions’s Babylon Complex 
(2014a)—the sublime, is hardly a nostalgic or romantic impulse then, even 
while it is tied to a certain willingness to entertain an almost incomprehensi-
bly open horizon. Wonder involves a tacit acknowledgment that the trajectory 
of social life, however over-determined, is not an inevitable one, and so while 
it allows for a hopeful take on the social body, it is not one without sinister 
implication. As Ahmed puts it, “[T]he very orientation of wonder, with its open 
faces and open bodies, involves a reorientation of one’s relation to the world. 
Wonder keeps bodies and spaces open to the surprise of others.” Shifting from 
major to minor key, she adds: “But we don’t know, with such bodies, what we 
can do” (2004: 183).22 
Affect and the wonder inspiring it posit an open social body for which the 
forces and factors moving it, pressing on it, are not only largely unmanageable, 
but also practically supernal. The appeal to wonder is one expression of an 
epistemology of awe funding so much affect theory; and it has almost painfully 
obvious theological resonances. One might imagine that this has something 
to do with Spinoza’s primary place in the history of theories of affect, since 
Spinoza’s understanding of affect is fundamentally theological. Spinoza posits 
a wholly immanent God—not an anthropomorphized God that has a body or 
emotions, but rather a “first affector” who moves through bodies: emotions for 
Spinoza are movements of the body that then affect the mind (Runions 2014b). 
As Erin has pointed out, it is easy to see Spinoza’s influence on Deleuze (and 
then Massumi after him), since “[e]motions are no longer a thing of interiority 
then, but something that pass through surfaces” (2014b: 4).
Runions discusses Spinoza’s theory of affect in the context of the contradic-
tory and ambivalent political uses of Psalm 139. She notes that Spinoza borrows 
Psalm 139 to suggest that prophetic words are limited imaginations (rather 
than revelations), and to oppose the notion that God should be understood 
anthropomorphically. But she also elegantly sews together Spinoza’s accounts 
of scripture, God, and affect: 
22   Ahmed cites Sedgwick’s Touching Feeling (2003) in her 2004 volume, but not in this sec-
tion, interestingly.
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What then of language? It seems that for Spinoza the mind can also be 
assisted or checked by memory of bodily impacts, which can be conveyed 
through language. The mind can also remember those things that move 
the body to greater activity and so pursue them (III, 12). Indeed, the mind 
can imagine “external bodies as if they were present to us,” (II Prof 17, 
Schol). Imagination and images therefore affect the body—including, 
one can infer, the imagination that is scripture. At the same time affective 
states produce images in the mind. . . . Here we have one way of think-
ing about how words and signification work in relation to affect: words 
can recall to the mind bodily affections or words can represent one’s own 
bodily affections. Word-images can move us because they remind of us 
external bodies; likewise, the motions of our bodies can be represented 
in word-images, which when read or heard can in turn affect other bod-
ies. So we can see how these pieces of Spinoza’s thought fit together: 
God as first affector, scripture as imagination and the body in motion. 
If God “speaks” through scripture, it is only in so far as bodies are in God, 
and that bodies respond to other bodies and to the physical memory and 
imagination of other bodies, which may be rendered in words. (Runions 
2014b: 5)
Although it might disappear into the annals of SBL panel history,23 Runions’s 
reincorporation of Spinoza into the project of biblical studies (he is its fore-
father after all, as she points out) is highly suggestive. The fact that Spinoza’s 
elaboration of affect is thoroughly theological provokes us to consider not only 
that some problematically theological ghost of Spinoza haunts affect theory, 
but also that the turn to affect itself represents a kind of theological impulse. 
As that which returns us from the abyss of disillusionment and again to wonder, 
that which is deeply personal but also impersonal and even transpersonal, the 
force beyond us that touches and moves us, that horizon of endless possibility, 
always bringing things into new and changing arrangements and affiliations, 
affect is perhaps the closest thing some of us non-theists/post-deists have to 
God. As such affect might very well represent another iteration of secularist 
presumption folding in on itself. After all, the Cartesian dissociation of the cog-
nitive and emotional was also, and not incidentally, an attempt to disjoin the 
body from the soul. 
23   Runions does not include her work on Spinoza in her re-write of the same piece (Runions 
forthcoming), but I’m grateful she’s allowed me to quote and cite it here.
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 Part 2: “I’m Just So Mad” (The Palliative of the Empirical)
“I think my life over the last eight years or so has been interwoven with affect 
theory, first Sedgwick, then Ahmed, then others (though they are still my favor-
ite). I don’t think of this as ‘my life with affect theory’ so much as ‘my life with 
these amazing writers who helped me think what I was trying to think’ . . .” 
Jennifer Knust writes to me in an email, responding to my request for any 
unpublished pieces she wrote that deal with affect theory. 
Jenny and I can hardly write anything without citing Sedgwick, which is 
just a symptom of the entire orientation change Sedgwick’s work kicked off 
in us, each of us have constructed whole essays around seemingly marginal 
Sedgwickian sentiments. Indeed, my first real interpersonal moment with 
Jenny outside of the formality of conferences was a set of email exchanges 
in which I sent her a draft of a paper on affect and the Corinthian correspon-
dence (Kotrosits 2011), and she sent me a draft of her paper on the Maccabean 
martyrs. Both cited Touching Feeling’s spot-on and basically embarrassing cri-
tiques of the “paranoid impulse” that rules so much of what is called simply 
“theory” in the post-linguistic turn. 
Jenny’s paper asked if the paranoid mode with which we typically view 
Jewish-Christian relations, especially in a post-Holocaust world, does jus-
tice to the full set of possibilities and mixed affiliations between “Jews” and 
“Christians,” especially evident around traditions celebrating the Maccabean 
martyrs (2015).24 I used Sedgwick’s affect theory only superficially, but was 
driving for a more deeply relational understanding of Paul’s letters and a more 
complicated way to understand their emotionally turbulent tone. Doesn’t this 
interfere with so many ideological readings of Paul? I asked. What if we truly 
read Paul as caught in the mess of his relationships? In that paper, I follow 
Sedgwick less in her theorizing around affect than in her turn away from the 
traditional Butlerian model of “identity performance” which, she suggests, col-
lapses the “internally complex field” of performance, and her turn to a space-
oriented and more “ecological” one (2003: 9).25 Touching Feeling, like so much 
24   Jenny has also used Sedgwick’s essay on paranoid and reparative readings in Knust 2014.
25   Re-reading that Corinthians essay, I notice now that this word “ecological” has been an 
epistemological preoccupation of mine on and off for quite some time. As I wrote then:
   Studies as well as popular readings of Paul’s letters typically view these affective 
changes and his relationships as functions of his ideological principles. The particularities 
of relationships are more often the crucible in which seemingly trans-situational prin-
ciples are born and die, and it requires no special pleading to suggest that one’s commit-
ments and speech vary wildly in different relational contexts. In this way, Paul as ideologue 
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of Sedgwick’s work, offers so many big concept changes that one can’t even 
quite characterize Touching Feeling as belonging to one strand of thought, 
even one as motley as “affect theory,” since under the auspices of affect it 
addresses such a wild assortment of topics and assumptions, ranging from 
considerations of texture and material/affective impingements to marriage as 
theatrical spectacle, and even her cat as Buddhist pedagogical model. 
A few days before I had emailed Jenny for her affect work, we had met for 
drinks in Cambridge with Alexis Waller, a Doctor of Theology student in New 
Testament at Harvard who was a good friend and colleague of mine since our 
overlapping time at Union. I explained to them my idea for this article, proud 
of my cleverness and exhilarated by the possibilities of writing an affective/
anecdotal intellectual history. I read to them my first paragraph, composed on 
my iPhone on the flight to Boston. Jenny picked up right away on the desire to 
think more about tensions between the empirical and the subjective. “Why 
am I so attached to old-fashioned biblical scholarship?!” she said, palms and 
eyes turned up in exasperation. To know Jenny is to know a scholar who can 
give a cool, seasoned extemporaneous account of, say, textual variations or 
manuscript traditions with a level of precise detail uncanny for even biblical 
scholars, and then break instantly into an impassioned plea, asking why we are 
not thinking about X, X being exactly the thing all of us in the room have been 
taking for granted. If I had answered her “why” in that moment, I probably 
would have said, “Because you’re so good at it!” It’s true—Jenny is thoroughly 
practiced at some of the most conservative methods and streams in biblical 
scholarship. Jenny also, however, keeps the epistemological stakes of any given 
argument always in sight—this basically defies all expectations for a disci-
pline in which material details and big picture significance are diametrically 
opposed, if more in practice than in theory.
I had just read Jenny’s recent essay on the adulteress woman in the Gospel 
of John, for instance, in which she considers (and complicates) feminist recep-
tions and interpretations of John 7:53–8:11. It is a story, Jenny suggests, which 
also appeals (problematically) to the notion of a unitary, coherent and autonomous sub-
ject whose conscious commitments over-determine his speech and interactions. It not 
only places Paul “above” and “outside” of the shaping effect of his relations, but entirely 
outside of Corinthian practice. (2011: 134–35).
   In fact, I brought the term “ecology” into a biopolitical reading of the letters of Ignatius 
of Antioch at the very same meeting for Westar Institute’s Christianity Seminar that Jenny 
presented her revised version of “Jewish Bones and Christian Bibles” (Kotrosits forthcom-
ing). I also notice that this Corinthians essay is my first recorded discontentment with 
“identity” or “identity performance” as an optic, a discontentment to be played out ad 
infinitum over the next several years.
16 Kotrosits
Brill Research Perspectives in Biblical Interpretation 1.1 (2016) 1–53
only reiterates the woman as inert object of male interchange (Knust forth-
coming). She borrows from Sedgwick’s Between Men (1985), which includes not 
only a critique of structuralism within and relative to feminism in academic 
circles, but also a theory of male homosocial desire, a kind of bonding that 
gets disavowed and enacted through, for example, rivalries over women, and 
is a constitutive factor of the culture of modernity. But Jenny also incorpo-
rates Sedgwick into a thorough ancient contextualization of the story, placing 
it among other ancient stories of adulteress women whose fates are similarly 
negotiated by men. In a mode absolutely distinct to Jenny, she incorporates 
the meticulous text-critical questions about the pericope into a handful of art-
fully rendered personal stories, ones which associate herself implicitly with 
the adulteress woman, to produce her feminist deconstructionist inquiry into 
the story and its reception. What this essay turns out to be, aside from a careful 
and idiosyncratic lacing of methods and style, is a reflection on a moralizing 
God’s disabling vacillations over a “suspicious” woman’s fate—Will God save 
her? At what cost to her agency?—and a longing for divine indifference. Jenny 
ends the piece with a description of her experience looking upon the cheru-
bim in the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul:
I’ve never actually seen these cherubim, except in pictures, but they vis-
ited me one night, or rather I visited them. They were stretching their 
wings out across a vast deep, with their feathers just barely touching, 
feather within feather, crossed at the tips, more than I could count. It was 
dark, maybe just before dawn or maybe just after sunset, and all around 
were the stark outlines of tall trees, hemlock and white pine stretching 
into the sky. The light behind the trees glowed a faint dusky pink, plac-
ing the rugged pines in high, dark relief. On the deep, the moon made 
patterns of pale light on the calm waters, creeping under the feathers, 
and reaching beyond the cherubim, who didn’t mind letting the light 
shine through. A person could just rest quietly on the tips of the feath-
ers, I thought, and stop trying so hard, and the vast world will continue, 
one way or another. The cherubim aren’t worried about good and evil. 
They aren’t thinking about me. Their feathers rustle in the wind while 
they remain absolutely still, holding up the world for a distant god who is 
so far away that only they can see him. Sometimes there is a loon call. The 
cherubim like that. (Knust forthcoming)
The cultural force and sexual politics (or theopolitics) of shame are repeat-
edly considered in Jenny’s work. She does so most directly in her first book 
Abandoned to Lust (2006), a chronicle of the rhetoric of sexual slander in early 
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Christian literature, and in Unprotected Texts (2011), a public audience book 
which delineates all the ways the Bible does not match up with contemporary 
expectations of so-called family values (and plays out the high stakes around 
the Bible’s misuse as a moral guidebook). Jenny indeed begins Unprotected 
Texts with a story about growing up in the Midwest, having become the unlikely 
target of slut-shaming after moving to a new school. I assign Unprotected Texts 
to my first year “Bible, Gender, and Sexuality” students, and whatever else they 
connect with in that book, Jenny’s anecdote is, according to them, far and away 
the most powerful and provocative takeaway. 
As much as Jenny delights in Sedgwick, and Touching Feeling in particular, 
she does not take up Sedgwick with regard to shame, even while questions of 
shame infuse and suffuse Jenny’s scholarship. And while the sexual politics 
of shame and the perils of paranoid readings are perhaps some of the most 
obvious preoccupations repeating themselves in Jenny’s work, there are other, 
less overt ones, gently pressing towards the surface: namely, a certain small-
ness of the subject (often, herself) in the face of things much larger—the Bible, 
history, discourse, God. One of the things I’ve come to appreciate most about 
Jenny and her work is the constant location of her appeals to her own experi-
ence alongside reflections about how relative we ourselves are to the mean-
ing of those experiences. For instance, in a SBL response to the volume Bible 
Trouble (Hornsby and Stone 2011)—a volume in which Erin Runions contrib-
utes the sole essay devoted to affect theory (2011a), Jenny begins her piece with 
a quote by poet Karl Kirchwey: “The city does not have, has never had you, in 
mind.” She goes on:
The past two months I have had the tremendous privilege of living and 
working at the American Academy in Rome, after somehow managing 
to hoodwink a few funding institutions and my home university into 
sending me there. I mention this because I don’t see how I can respond 
to the essays in Bible Trouble, with their fearless determination to read 
from somewhere while simultaneously refusing to accept that one must 
read biblical texts from any one place, without situating myself in what 
has become my particular city at my particular moment, this city that, 
the poet Karl Kirchwey reminds me, never had me in mind. Listening 
to Karl read his poem a few weeks ago, it struck me that this is also a 
problem shared by Bible scholars or, perhaps better, readers of the Bible 
in general: 
The Bible does not have you, has never had you, in mind.
To which I might add: Of course it doesn’t. And of course it never will. 
(Knust 2012: 1)
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Here relativity means a relaxing anonymity underlined by a sort of divine 
indifference—not unlike her description of the angels, but somehow more 
sinister, closer to (but not the same as) the sinister and distant indecision of 
God. The bigness of the Bible and the powerful aura of shame it casts over the 
very others it constructs are her prompt for the “it’s not about us” recognitions. 
This is both ironic and intuitively perfect. In Jenny’s work, her/our pain, her/
our injury, is the vehicle for better understanding the Bible, history, discourse, 
and God. But the singularity of that pain also diffuses (though not completely) 
in the face of them. 
“The empirical is palliative,” writes Brian Massumi, describing an experiment 
in which scientists tried to isolate visual perception from the other senses (2002: 
161). They could not, it turns out. Subjects in the study couldn’t see anything, 
because the senses don’t operate in isolation; they cross-reference each other: 
The newly visioned blind do not see things. They feel a pain in their 
eyes. . . . With more experience, the feeling of the effect comes to be iden-
tified. Reactions in different sense modes are cross-referenced. . . . The 
experience has been determined, objectified, empiricized. . . . With that 
passage, and that determination, the pain is (provisionally) assuaged. 
(Massumi 2002: 161) 
Seeing, as metaphor for the empirical, is tied inextricably to feeling.26 
That quote by Massumi is how I began the body of Rethinking Early Christian 
Identity (Kotrosits 2015c). For me it was a poetic capture of the ways in which 
empiricist modes of scholarship function for historians of the Bible and early 
Christianity (Kotrosits 2015c: 21–26).27 Neither in the book nor now do I mean 
to identify particular people with empiricist modes, as if I do not hold dear 
to them periodically. Indeed, this is what makes Jenny’s scholarship such an 
important instance for reflections on empiricism. Wary of the shortcomings 
of biblical scientism, Jenny fully integrates them into some of the most vul-
nerable, most genuinely open self-reflections in the field as it stands, as if the 
former allows for the latter. “Why am I so attached to old fashioned biblical 
scholarship?” Jenny herself later answered her own why: it’s not just about 
mastery, it’s about mastery in the face of injury, injuries in which the Bible is 
26   I have written about seeing and affect in Revelation and ancient visual culture in Kotrosits 
2014a.
27   I should have noted, however, that Massumi’s own interest in “the empirical” is a bit more 
complicated than that quote might suggest. See for instance, Massumi 2002: 208–256, 
where he advocates for an “expanded empiricism.”
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fully implicated (and of course, these aren’t just Jenny’s injuries). “I’m just so 
mad about the Bible.”
I sympathize with Jenny’s anger, of course. Though not cutting as close to 
the bone for me at the moment, and frequently appearing more as grief, my 
own sense of helplessness about the Bible derives (I think?) from the com-
bination of its seemingly benign and genial reception among my immediate 
family members, and then a belatedly learned history of the intense kinds of 
shame coalescing around it for other members of my family. In particular, I was 
troubled and stunned to learn of a great uncle who had committed suicide—
his depression and his cultural queerness (if not homosexuality) compound-
ing each other, haunted and perhaps funded by his/my family’s conservative 
Mennonite biblicism. I began my book with Hal Taussig, Rereading the Gospel 
of Mark Amidst Loss and Trauma with a brief, unadorned reflection about his 
death and the way it figured in my family. But the reflection was told, some-
what unsurprisingly, in the distant comfort of the third person (Kotrosits and 
Taussig 2013).28 
“We all have ways of protecting ourselves,” Carly Daniel-Hughes observed 
with a kind of warm resignation, “Jenny arms herself with knowledge.” We were 
at the 2015 Westar Institute’s Christianity Seminar meeting. It was a casual con-
versation about being a woman in the male-dominated field of biblical stud-
ies, and we had just seen Jenny present on manuscript traditions. In Jenny’s 
later exasperation over her attachment to more empirical-seeming modes 
of scholarship, she expressed admiration and perhaps envy for my ability to 
flout tradition and dive all in to the wild possibilities and utterly messy half-
transformations of reading theory. But at this moment in my scholarship, I am 
less sure of those virtues. I’m not less sure that an ability to creatively “forget” 
disciplinary mechanisms and lose oneself into a sea of experiential and aes-
thetic possibility is a virtue, but I’m certainly less sure of my desire and ability 
to perform it. If this present piece is more thoroughly entrenched in the aes-
thetics, mess, and experiential ground of affect theory, it is because it stands 
in contrast to a sudden re-investment on my part in more traditional forms of 
history. As of late, I find myself making recourse to things like dense philolo-
gies and concrete social practices, and suddenly caring a lot about, say, the set 
of highly specific political circumstances dominating Antioch, Syria, and the 
28   I reflect on the third person and pain, in fact, in chapter three of that book, waxing at 
length on the sculptures of Louise Bourgeois and the way Jesus’ breaks into discussion of 
the “son of Man” when describing his own suffering (Kotrosits and Taussig 2013: 41–56).
20 Kotrosits
Brill Research Perspectives in Biblical Interpretation 1.1 (2016) 1–53
impact that might have on the letters of Ignatius.29 I can’t predict whether or 
not those interests will dominate my cultural studies inclinations, and I won-
der about the vague, and probably largely imagined, promises for recognition 
and advancement that becoming more conventional might hold. Frankly, it is 
a toss-up which dimensions of anyone’s work—the experimental or the ortho-
dox—will be rewarded or forgotten, so I’m not losing too much sleep over 
it. But it is worth noticing that affect theory figures for both Jenny and I as a 
much-needed intervention in the epistemologies in which we’ve been trained, 
ones which we resent, but ones to which we are deeply attached because they 
enabled some kind of mitigated engagement with an object of widespread cul-
tural trauma—an object that never had us in mind. 
 Part 3: History between Women
It occurs to me as I write this not only how much affect theory is funded by and 
subtended by discussions of gender and sexuality, but how a certain homoso-
cial force field surrounds affect theory in biblical studies as well. I can’t seem 
to frame my experience with affect theory without recourse to my admiration, 
even adoration, of certain colleagues and scholars, nearly all of whom are 
women (some of whom I know personally, some of whom I do not). It is indeed 
a homosocial force field in part because the desire, the eros, that imbues it, 
doesn’t always or even usually have a clear object or direction. Shared attach-
ments seem to intensify mutual admiration, for instance, as in the case of 
Jenny’s and my joint love of Sedgwick. With Erin, too, I felt a sense not only 
of mutual attachment, but that we were onto some kind of “theory secret,” 
which was only confirmed by the tiny SBL sessions, both public and sparsely 
attended, in which we were participating.30 So is it only true that shared 
29   Questions of sense and feeling, and the capacity to be moved, still accompany these other 
historical impulses, of course. But as I suggest (a little more cautiously) in Rethinking 
Early Christian Identity (2015), the shrugging around questions of “what it was really like 
back then” that typifies discursive criticism in the vein of Foucault feels so distanced and 
shy to me—why not dive in and speculate (because history in any form is, after all, highly 
qualified speculation)? The answer is, I suspect, because we know that we can’t ever be 
right about “what it was really like” and the ledge onto which we might step is just a little 
too high and narrow.
30   Case in point, and perhaps the first session in SBL history to be formed around affect the-
ory was for the Bible and Cultural Studies Section in New Orleans in 2009, and attended 
by only three people in addition to the presenters. Two of the attendees were Stephen 
Moore and Jenny Knust. It was in this session which Erin presented her first iteration of 
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attachments intensify mutual admiration? Or is it also true that my admiration 
for Jenny and Erin, as scholars in whose molds I wished to cast myself, inten-
sified my love of affect theory? Admiration is, of course, always an unstable 
cocktail of identification and desire, and in my own scholarly circles, admira-
tion seems to propagate itself unevenly as a network of intimacies with books, 
ideas, and people alike. As Sedgwick so perfectly poses it: “What does it mean 
to fall in love with a writer?” (2003: 83).
Shared theoretical attachments provide a common language for experience, 
creating a textural ambiance for relationships and heightening the possibili-
ties for recognition within them. In April of 2013, the month I defended the 
dissertation that would become Rethinking Early Christian Identity (Kotrosits 
2015), Alexis forwarded me an email from Bluestockings, a feminist bookstore 
on the Lower East Side of Manhattan. It publicized an event featuring Carolyn 
Dinshaw and Ann Cvetkovich speaking about their most recent books: How 
Soon is Now? (Dinshaw 2012) and Depression: A Public Feeling (Cvetkovich 
2014). Alexis and I and a couple of other Masters and Doctoral students from 
Union and Drew Theological School made our way downtown and sat among 
a modest audience of 25 or so others, and listened to Dinshaw and Cvetkovich 
recount not only their writing processes, but also some bits and pieces of their 
relationship over the years. They noticed the funny coincidence of bathrobes 
appearing in both of their books: for Dinshaw it was a bathrobe-wearing dilet-
tante Medievalist who provokes her to wax on the queer virtues of the amateur, 
and for Cvetkovich protesters in bathrobes provided a signal instance of the 
power of making depression a “public feeling,” one closely linked to the condi-
tions of late capitalism. 
Dinshaw and Cvetkovich are historians, and each of them has offered their 
own contributions to rethinking the historiographical enterprise. Dinshaw’s 
work in Getting Medieval (1999) addresses modern uses (including misap-
propriations) of medieval texts and figures to suggest that history represents 
a queer desire to “touch across time” (Dinshaw 1999: 3), a desire for affective 
community.31 Dinshaw goes on in How Soon is Now? to propose some ways of 
“From Humor to Disgust” (2011a). That essay later appeared in Postscripts before finding 
its way into Bible Trouble. I presented the first formal iteration of “Romance and Danger 
at Nag Hammadi” (Kotrosits 2012) at that same session, and Thomas Fabisiak presented a 
paper entitled, “Hatred and Critical Study of the New Testament: Charles Dupuis on the 
Gospel History of Jesus.”
31   For a forum of published remarks by a group of religion scholars responding to Dinshaw 
1999, see Elizabeth, Hale, Hollywood, Jordan, Pellegrini, Zito, and Dinshaw 2001. I’m 
embarrassed to say that I only found out about Getting Medieval belatedly, and upon 
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occupying time queerly, thus interrupting the normative presumption of the 
linearity of time; she also proposes more specifically that time itself is queer 
(Dinshaw 2012). 
Cvetkovich’s book Depression, like her earlier An Archive of Feelings (2003), 
takes not only a concertedly social approach to feelings—a move she associ-
ates with the second-wave feminist axiom, “the personal is political”—but a 
fully depathologizing one (2014: 3–10).32 In Depression she does so in order to 
intervene in the dominance of medical diagnostics and pharmaceutical treat-
ments for depression, historicizing it by also connecting it with the contexts 
and uses of the Latin term acedia. In Archive of Feelings, her depathologizing, 
historicizing approach to trauma works as a critique of so many dominant 
theories of trauma, such as the oft-cited work of Cathy Caruth. Caruth’s work is, 
as Cvetkovich notes, informed by Holocaust studies, and thus tends to imagine 
trauma as a single catastrophe, the memory of which disappears, causing cer-
tain epistemological conundrums (Cvetkovich 2003: 18). As Cvetkovich writes, 
A PTSD clinical diagnosis defines trauma as an overwhelming event that 
produces certain kinds of symptoms in the patient. Poststructuralist the-
ory defines it as an event that is unrepresentable. I want to think about 
trauma as part of an affective language that describes life under capi-
talism. I’m interested in how shock and injury are made socially mean-
ingful, paradigmatic even, within cultural experience. I want to focus 
on how traumatic events refract outward to produce all kinds of affec-
tive responses and not just clinical symptoms. Moreover, in contrast to 
the individualist approaches of clinical psychology, I’m concerned with 
trauma as a collective experience that generates collective responses. 
(Cvetkovich 2003: 19)
Cvetkovich’s histiographical approach then is one in which “constructing 
the history of the United States from the vantage point of trauma produces 
a critical American studies, one that revises a celebratory account of the 
nation and instead illuminates its emergence from a history that includes cap-
italism and economic exploitation, war, colonialism and genocide of native 
peoples, and slavery, diaspora, and migration” (Cvetkovich 2003: 36). She not 
Alexis’s recommendation, since it seemed that so much that I was trying to articulate 
about affect, history, and textuality was already expressed (and with much more sophis-
tication) there.
32   Cvetkovich talks about “feminism as affective turn.” For my own read on how affect might 
help us think anew about feminist politics and “solidarity,” see Kotrosits 2013.
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only addresses national trauma history from the “unabashedly minoritarian 
perspective of lesbian cultures,” but also reads cultural texts as “repositories 
of feelings and emotions,” thus providing “a point of entry into a vast archive of 
feelings, the many forms of love, rage, intimacy, grief, shame, and more that 
are part of the vibrancy of queer cultures” (Cvetkovich 2003: 7). Importantly, 
trauma challenges not only dominant or triumphalist histories, but also what 
we consider the material for doing history. It “puts pressure on conventional 
forms of documentation,” and demands an “unusual archive, whose materials, 
in pointing to trauma’s ephemerality, are themselves frequently ephemeral” 
such as memories, letters, photographs, or sentimentally invested objects 
(Cvetkovich 2003: 7). 
While Depression actually takes up questions of “the sacred” and theological 
language, it was, in fact, Archive of Feelings with which most of us theologi-
cal students who had gone to Bluestockings that evening were most in love.33 
After the event we headed to Death and Co., a dark bar in the east village, and 
enthused over Archive of Feelings with prohibition-era cocktails in hand—not 
(just) because we felt somehow, somewhere voiced by Cvetkovich, as if sud-
denly the many reverberations and seemingly minor felt significances of our 
complicated lives and the lives of so many we loved were given their due. As 
I recall, we were primarily taken with the notion of an archive of feelings, at 
large, as well as the notion of negotiating the past through beloved, if seem-
ingly marginal, objects and our perhaps baroque attachments to them. 
About six months later, a handful of us would use Cvetkovich’s apparent 
theological interests in Depression as leverage to wrangle her into what we 
imagined was an improbable small-group conversation with us, a bunch of 
theological school students, at Union’s courtyard. (She graciously and with 
great interest agreed.) Three of us were incorporating, to different extents, 
Cvetkovich’s work on history and trauma. My recently completed dissertation 
was a reading of late first- and early second-century literature in and around 
the New Testament (including the Gospel of John, 1 Peter, Acts, the Secret 
Revelation of John, and the letters of Ignatius) not as “early Christian” litera-
ture, but as responses to the traumas of colonization and political divestment 
constitutive of Judean (diasporic) experience (Kotrosits 2015). The dissertation 
abandoned most categorical and traditional theological associations with these 
texts in favor of a “between the lines” close reading approach that attended to 
33   This is what I remember, but is this true? Lindsey Briggs, for example, had just done her 
Master of Divinity thesis project on Depression. But I also remember a long conversation 
with her in which we each stated, without any sense of hyperbole, that Archive of Feelings 
was a mind- and practice-altering read.
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affective resonances. It specifically leaned into Cvetkovich’s interjection into 
“celebratory accounts of the nation,” bringing that same philosophy and strat-
egy to triumphalist accounts of Christianity (whether that triumph is seen to 
be sinister or justified). 
Tiffany Houck-Loomis was a doctoral student in both Hebrew Bible and 
Psychiatry and Religion at Union, and was in the middle of producing a re-
reading of the Deuteronomic Covenant and its counter-narrative in Job in 
relation to traumatic experience (2014).34 Alexis was writing about the Gospel 
of Mark and The Thunder: Perfect Mind (a text from the Nag Hammadi codi-
ces) as affective archives representing collectivities constructed around and 
responding creatively to spectacular colonial violence. She was building on 
(and giving more edge) to readings Hal Taussig and I produced of those texts 
(Kotrosits and Taussig 2013; Taussig, Calaway, Kotrosits, Lillie, and Lasser 2010), 
and was providing a refined historical reorientation to them that includes the 
ways these texts might bespeak and produce certain traumatized publics and 
counter-publics, as well as the ways they “make a particular sphere of affective 
life visible to history” (Waller 2014: 471).35 
Alexis, like and with me, saw more than a single-shot interpretive lens in 
Cvetkovich. Cvetkovich’s Archive of Feelings represented, and still represents, 
for us an entirely novel set of historical sensitivities. What kinds of experi-
ences (not just people) are we automatically attuned to when we read ancient 
literature, and what kinds of experiences might leave traces that demand 
enlargement and elaboration? What is the felt subtext of certain kinds of 
representation and expression? As Hal’s students, albeit a few years apart, 
we had read and thoroughly internalized Vincent Wimbush’s introduction in 
African Americans and the Bible, which already had us reading ancient litera-
ture “darkly” (Wimbush 2001).36 But Cvetkovich’s form of account accommo-
dated so much. Periodically autoethnographic if not fully engaged in memoir, 
distinctly literary, and consistently offering a deep and sympathetic attention 
to the objects, moments, and people otherwise rendered negligible, it was 
simultaneously plump, sonorous, and delicate. Cvetkovich’s commitment to 
34   Tiffany, however, didn’t use cultural studies as much as depth psychology in the Jungian 
tradition.
35   Alexis had presented this work as a paper at SBL in Baltimore in 2012 at the Reading 
Theory and the Bible Section. She later published this piece (Waller 2014) as part of the 
Biblical Interpretation issue formed around that session (Koosed and Moore [eds.] 2014). 
Also in that issue, and deriving from that session, along with Koosed 2014a and Knust 
2014, is Cottrill 2014.
36   Cvetkovich’s historiographical approach, if I were to clumsily assimilate it to biblical stud-
ies, would be something like putting Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza’s work in a pot with 
Vincent Wimbush’s work and stirring vigorously.
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and sophisticated re-upping of lesbian feminist politics met up with a cer-
tain implicit refusal to enter the theoretically hot discourse of transcendental 
queerness, around which we too sometimes felt skepticism and exhaustion.37 
Quite simply, we both loved her, and we adored her just as much in person as 
in her writing. 
Alexis and I first encountered each other as teacher and student: I was her 
teaching “fellow” (pardon the term) for Brigitte Kahl’s “Introduction to the 
New Testament” class. Alexis was failing, and doing so brilliantly, at traditional 
historical critical methods and exegesis. She wrote in large, black, artists’ note-
books, collecting quotes from readings and class, sometimes scrawling draw-
ings in the middle of the page. (I noticed this because in my first two years of 
graduate school, I had done something like this, too.) In our meetings about 
her incomplete work, she expressed good-humored but stubborn resistance, 
and only a little regret, over not “getting it.” But her observations about the 
texts we were reading melded razor-sharp observation with dreamy elabora-
tion; she read lovingly and with frustration, one feeling seemingly and con-
tinuously giving way to the other. Her notebook was a collage of associations, 
carefully curated: a portrait of evocations. 
I pressured her to stay in the class, and gave her a handful of essays and chap-
ters from less traditional biblical scholarship to read, one of which, I remem-
ber, was the first third or so of Stephen Moore’s God’s Gym (1996), another 
of which was, of course, Vincent Wimbush’s “Reading Darkness, Reading 
Scriptures” (2001).38 She stayed, perhaps out of my coercion and reassurance, 
but perhaps also (or more so) out of the magnetism and frustration incited by 
her first encounter with biblical studies.39 Could any combination of feelings 
be more sustaining?40 
37   On my own hesitations about transcendental queerness and an affective reorientation to 
some of the contexts for queer theory, see Kotrosits 2016 (forthcoming).
38   Both of these readings are cult classics for biblical studies, at least in my world.
39   Not incidental to this is that Alexis came to Union having heard Hal talk at her mother’s 
church about The Thunder: Perfect Mind. Hal exudes (and regularly voices) an almost 
wondrous combination of gentle, somewhat distanced, love and frustration with the 
field. Hal’s love seems to come in the form of a nurturing appreciation for both the com-
plexities of people’s personal motivations, and the crystallizations of ideas in and among 
relationships (my loyalty to him in this essay, specifically, is quite clear). Brigitte’s own 
love for and frustrations with the field were (and are) quite different, given her attach-
ment to traditional forms of biblical scholarship, and her deployment of those forms to 
empire-critical ends (e.g. Kahl 2010), what was a highly taboo move at the time of her own 
doctoral training in East Germany.
40   For more on history and frustration, see my response to the work of Burton Mack in 
Kotrosits 2015b.
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Over the course of several more semesters spent in the same classroom, 
and with constant cycling between informal mentorship and a more collegial, 
affectionate mutual admiration, Alexis and I were regular, riveted conversation 
partners. If Hal was the most enabling authoritative presence in my life while 
writing Rethinking Early Christian Identity (Kotrosits 2015), Alexis was my co-
conspirator. I gave a mini-lecture on affect theory in Hal’s “Christ and Cosmos” 
course, an unfortunately graceless one, but Alexis joined me in my sense of 
possibility about how seriously affect theory changes, well, everything about 
the way we do biblical studies. I remember being in the throes of infant parent-
ing, in the haze of dissertation-writing and unprecedented levels of sleep loss, 
one hand holding my son Rocco’s head in place as he breastfed, the other hand 
simultaneously pressing open a book and texting Alexis long quotes from that 
book (the book being Cvetkovich’s Archive of Feelings). We spent perhaps the 
most time talking about that book (though if you counted Sedgwick’s com-
bined work, Archive of Feelings would have to come in second).
I sometimes have a hard time remembering if it was me or Alexis who 
first had a certain idea (a phenomenon I have with others, including Hal, 
and my husband). “Touching Pasts, Loving Things” I recently asked her, “was 
that you or me?” It was a subheading I was considering for the present essay. 
“I dunno,” she wrote, “maybe just a combination of people we love?” (She was 
right, at least partially: “Touching the Past” is the title of Dinshaw’s introduc-
tion in Getting Medieval.) Indeed I believe (correct me if I’m wrong, Alexis) 
that I had the very idea for this form of intellectual history, an ecology of ideas 
generated in the messy cauldron of relationships, while walking to Death and 
Co. post-Cvetkovich. Then, as now, Alexis’s ability to join me in playing with 
ideas (as she would put it), her constructive idealizations (as she, through 
Adam Phillips, would also put it), easily sweeps me up into a dense, creative 
vapor. And yet the words of others figure large in our relationship: she often 
responds to my ideas, my dogged pursuit of the new, my relentless desire for 
a twist or turn on the old, with a quote from someone else—a writer, an art-
ist, a blogger. Often these quotes are minimally contextualized. Relationally, 
Alexis is at her most elegant when coaxing out the latent possibilities of other 
people’s waxing, usually doing so with an almost wild and provocative atten-
tiveness: that is, her sense of “what’s there” bleeds seamlessly into a sense of 
“what’s more.”
But on the question of the words of others: how often it is that we negoti-
ate, and mitigate, desire through objects of mutual affection—to paraphrase 
Sedgwick in Between Men (1985)—in this case, ideas. I mean the “we” of aca-
demics/intellectuals at large, probably, but with special attention to the loose 
collection of people with whom I think about affect. “Have you read A Dialogue 
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on Love yet (Sedgwick 2000)?” I recall either Jenny or Alexis or someone else 
insisting while grabbing me by the hand or shoulder. However, not unlike the 
women circulated in male homosocial relations, ideas are not inert objects; 
they have their own lively agencies that collaborate with (or interrupt) the 
agency of those who circulate them. Ideas take flight within relationships, and 
relationships take flight in the exchange of ideas. Fawning or rhapsodizing over 
the words of others, over wine or otherwise in those smaller relational spaces 
we carve out within more formal stalwarts of academic life like conferences, 
we invite our conversation partners to recognize and play with us. We not only 
show what we love, but ask them to love what we love. While not thinking 
especially about affect, Jane Gallop’s The Deaths of the Author reminds us of 
the intense affective and splintered intersubjective dimensions of reading and 
writing. She performs a close reading of Roland Barthes’s Sade, Fourier, Loyola 
(1976), in which she finds articulated a transmigration of the author, in bits and 
pieces, into the life of the reader: “Living with an author is having ‘fragments’ 
from his text in our dailiness” (2011: 49). Of course we incorporate not only the 
author in bits and pieces, but also the vehicle through which we first heard that 
author, the voice that repeated those words to us, over dinner, in a cab, or sit-
ting against the wall on the industrial carpeting between conference sessions. 
That is to say, in speaking the beloved words of others, we ask our conversation 
partners to take us in, to consume us too. 
I fear falling into some idealized narrative of relationships between women 
in academia. All of the relationships I will have recounted here, ones with men 
and with women, have been fortifying, creative, constructive, endearing, vital, 
and integrity-saving for me—but sometimes also tinged with awkwardness, 
strain, power imbalances, and/or minor relational failures. And I do want to 
point to the ways the idiosyncratic fringe movement of the burgeoning of 
affect theory in biblical studies was not “just” about expressions of frustration 
with the field, grief relating to the Bible, senses of attachment and/or eros. If 
male homosocial relations are at the crux of the culture of modernity—and 
let’s firmly place the male-dominated discipline of biblical studies within this 
homosocial production of modernity—then let’s just for a moment also notice 
the intellectual significance and culturally productive power of the gendered 
ecology I have rendered here, one not just begetting or explaining affect in 
biblical studies as if it is some kind of trend, but one about making history dif-
ferently as well. My perspective, as one with a decent amount of access to the 
emergence of affect in biblical studies, has afforded me the chance to witness 
impressive, if underplayed, breakthroughs in the historiographical enterprise, 
and these breakthroughs are thoroughly planted in the mud of so many com-
plex intimacies between (mostly, but not exclusively) women.
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I am particularly sensitive to this notion of affect theory as a trend. Not 
only does the notion of an intellectual “trend” relegate profoundly meaning-
ful developments, ones which might force certain epistemological changes 
of tide to the ephemeral, making them destined for disappearance over and 
against the more steadfast and unchanging modes of operation. Calling some-
thing a “trend,” or treating it as such, in other words, is the easiest way to avoid 
substantively dealing with it.41 Affect theory as trend in biblical studies has 
a subtle way of then making some impressive historiographical and episte-
mological moves, again ones mostly (and not incidentally) propounded by 
women, seem like a blip on the screen, a distraction from the “real issues” of 
biblical studies. 
I must admit a certain defensiveness, even possessiveness, around affect 
theory, and this is not unrelated to the history between women entangled in it. 
At the 2014 SBL annual meeting in San Diego, the Bible and Emotion Section 
underwrote a session on affect theory. It was composed entirely of invited 
panelists: Erin Runions, Jenny Knust, Jennifer Koosed, Stephen Moore, Amy 
Cottrill, and myself. Stephen Moore and Erin Runions offered papers, with 
Jenny and I responding to Stephen’s paper, and Amy and Jennifer responding 
to Erin’s. It was at this session that the stakes of affective considerations in bib-
lical studies most crystallized for me. The session’s organizers had contacted 
Stephen to see if he would be interested in offering a paper, and if he could 
recommend other participants. Stephen, who had been my mentor and regular 
conversation partner for maybe seven years, who had served on my disserta-
tion committee, and had for most of that time affectionately entertained my 
near-constant recourse to Sedgwick, Puar, Ahmed, and others, forwarded me 
the email.42 “I’m thinking of doing it,” he wrote. 
41   I’ve probably called affect theory a trend, somewhere, and probably even in print. Maybe 
several times. And as Hal recently reminded me, it was this very “trend” factor that made 
me hesitate in engaging theories of affect so specifically in Rethinking Early Christian 
Identity (Kotrosits 2015). I feared not only being over-identified with a theory (“that affect 
theory scholar”) that would, some day, simply have been a flash in the pan, but also 
needed the real historical propositions I make to be understood as such.
42   He showed interest, of course, too. In fact, Stephen invited me to visit his “Revelation” 
class, at Drew Theological School in Spring 2013, to talk about my article on Revelation 
(now Kotrosits 2014a), a draft of which he assigned. I remember him doing a close reading 
of the paper in class, expressing variously subtle curiosity, surprise, and gentle apprecia-
tion regarding my affective intervention on ideological readings of Revelation. Alexis was 
taking the class, but there were other Drew Theological School students in the course who 
had already expressed an interest in affect theory. One was Paige Rawson, a doctoral stu-
dent in biblical studies, who was part of the group who saw Cvetkovich at Bluestockings, 
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Stephen was and is famous, of course, for calling attention to whatever set 
of theories or foci were sweeping up the Modern Language Association at the 
moment, and setting them loose on New Testament literature. But he had 
hardly published or presented on affect, and it was his single paper on affect 
theory that had drawn the organizers’ attention.43 The story was painfully pre-
dictable: two men contacted another (well-situated) man to enlighten them on 
“This New Theory,” one on which half a dozen women had already quite exten-
sively published. When asked for a list of possible other participants, Stephen 
named those of us who had been working with affect theory in the first place. 
Erin’s paper, the piece on Psalm 139 and affect (parts of which I summa-
rized and quoted above), was typical for Erin in both its understatement and 
significance (Runions 2014b). She waxed on the very different, and unlikely, 
political uses of Psalm 139—as scriptural sponsor for both pro-LGBTQ politics 
and pro-life politics. In particular, pro-life activists use the psalm to advocate 
for mandatory ultrasounds for women seeking abortions. “You have searched 
and known me” (Ps. 139:1), while gesturing to recognition for queer-identified 
people, also gestures to the surveilled womb, and figures a God whose “love” is 
not as much unbridled acceptance as deliverance from that God’s own threat. 
It was not only critically and analytically compelling, but also haunting. In this 
theopolitics, God chases, pursues, and if we’re lucky, relents. 
Jennifer’s response picked up on the affective life and theopolitics of 
surveillance:
We all like to be watched, despite any protestations to the contrary. 
Especially in our current age of social media, the first line of Psalm 139 res-
onates: “You have searched me and you know me”—searched, Googled, 
and who spoke with Cvetkovich in the courtyard at Union. Another was Karen Bray, 
a theology student, who was writing a dissertation on affect theory. Stephen was later 
one coordinator of the Drew Transdisciplinary Theological Colloquium (along with Joe 
Marchal and Kent Brintnall) devoted to queer temporality and affect (much more the 
former than the latter), in which I participated. Indeed, there is another TTC at Drew in 
the Spring of 2016 which is solely devoted to affect theory, including (from biblical stud-
ies and this article) Erin Runions, Jenny Knust, Stephen Moore, Alexis Waller, and Joseph 
Marchal alongside Mel Chen, Patricia Clough, Ann Cvetkovich, Eugenie Brinkema, and 
Gregory Seigworth. The volume of essays produced from the Spring 2014 TTC is Brintnall, 
Marchal, and Moore 2016 (forthcoming).
43   His foray into affect theory, presented a year earlier at SBL, is now Moore 2014a. While the 
Bible and Emotion Section of SBL was only just learning about affect theory, the Religion, 
Affect, and Emotion Group of the AAR had addressed affect/affect theory several times in 
its few years of existence.
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spied. We lay ourselves open through Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, for all 
to see and for corporations and the government to survey. You are all now 
watching me. Do I like it? Your surveillance could bring, if not love, then 
approval, but it also threatens. What if you don’t like what you see, what 
you hear? I am caught between these two potentialities. (Koosed 2014b: 1) 
In her piece, Jennifer noted that both those for and against mandatory ultra-
sounds appeal to emotion for their arguments. Pro-life activists imagine an 
ideal maternal affective response upon seeing the ultrasound. But representa-
tives of Planned Parenthood claimed that mandatory ultrasounds were trying 
to shame and demean, even terrorize, women. Koosed observed:
Where one side imagines a maternal response of love and protection, 
the other side imagines the surveillance of the womb eliciting feelings 
of terror and shame. Provoked by the ultrasound image, how will the 
bodily intensities circulate; provoked by the textual image, how will 
the oscillations of Psalm 139 resolve? (Koosed 2014b: 5)
She went on:
What bodily posture could be more shame-inducing than lying on your 
back, naked from the waist down, legs raised and split in stirups, geni-
tals exposed, the folds flattened, and a foreign metal object thrust into 
your body against your will? Where do you look? Do you turn your head 
around to see the screen? Do you avert your eyes, a classic posture of 
shame? Who is the surveyor of your womb? You, the doctor, the state, 
God? The machine is merged with the human body, the subject position 
of the woman shifts and sildes, as Runions points out, in an ironic post-
humanist, post-deist form of subjectivity. Certainly, shame in the sense 
of exposure and disapproval and prohibition can be experienced here. 
(Koosed 2014b: 6)
Interestingly, however, and against pro-life assumptions, a woman seeking an 
abortion is not really dissuaded by seeing an ultrasound of her fetus. “Some 
even found the ultrasound pictures reassuring because a fetus in the very early 
stages of pregnancy (37.8% of abortions happen at or before the fetus has 
reached the gestational age of four weeks) is very small and really doesn’t look 
like a baby” (Koosed 2014b: 3). Why can’t pro-lifers imagine this possibility? 
Koosed concluded: 
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Perhaps the inability to read and accept the data that demonstrates that 
the political energies of anti-abortionists are misplaced in their advocacy 
of mandatory ultrashounds is also the inability to read Psalm 139 nega-
tively and face the threat of God’s surveillance. That in the interminable 
oscillation between love and threat, that the resolution is less often on 
love and more often on threat—and even worse the threat is not a result 
of divine malice but because God looked upon our innermost parts, and 
found us strange. And it is this divine indifference that ultimately leads to 
our destruction. (Koosed 2014b: 6) 
I was devastated by her response—not just the content of it or the sensory 
experiences she conjured, which are so clearly devastating themselves. As I try 
to parse why, or what about it caused me to vibrate psychologically for days 
afterwards, I think it has something to do with her voice. She paused uncom-
fortably as she took to the podium. It was a medium-sized room, with the usual 
fluorescent lighting and grey walls. It was not terribly different than the anti-
septic and clinical feel of the doctor’s office Jennifer was describing, the one 
with the ultrasound machines and stirrups, the clinician who might insist that 
you turn your head and look. Was her voice shaking a bit? She didn’t seem 
nervous, exactly. I remember not just the shaking, but the dare and provoca-
tion with which it was paired: “You are all now watching me. Do I like it?” She 
paused again. I was watching her, and her vulnerability was riveting. “Your sur-
veillance could bring, if not love, then approval, but it also threatens.” 
Stephen wrote about disgust in the Gospel of John, and it was entitled, 
“More Than a Feeling.” As he wrote: “The Johannine narrative is replete with 
understated—indeed, unstated—affect, one affect in particular, as we are 
about to see. That affect is not love, I would argue, despite the frequency of 
love-language in the narrative. . . . The Fourth Gospel . . . is structured by dis-
gust” (2014: 19–20). With aptly sensorial description, Stephen’s reading thrust 
his reader into the fleshy, terrible mess of the Gospel of John—our hands in 
the wounds, as it were—where flesh is, as he puts it “always already rotting, 
even in life” (2014: 21). He made sure his readers felt at least a hint of John’s 
disgust. 
My gut response (pardon the pun), however, was confusion. Before Stephen’s 
paper, I did not feel disgust coming from John. I’ve felt other affects coming 
from John, and those things have changed over the years: disillusionment, 
pain, desperation, moralizing self-righteousness, and wonder in the Gospel, 
but not yet, or at least not very much, disgust. “It could be that I’m not as close 
a reader as Stephen—which is not a bad bet to take—and thus I haven’t quite 
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been able to notice how much disgust shapes the Gospel of John,” I wrote. “But 
this poses some questions about affect and textual life, however. If disgust 
structures the Gospel of John, why did I not feel it until I read Stephen’s paper? 
What does it mean that a text ‘structured on disgust’ doesn’t feel disgusting to 
a given reader?” “Even now,” I continued,
I’m not sure how much my sense of disgust arrives from Stephen’s paper 
and how much from the Gospel. While I’m happy to trust Stephen’s 
reading, at least as much as my own, I do notice Stephen’s penchant for 
finding disgust circulating in and around New Testament literature: not 
only in his most recent article on Revelation, but who can forget his ren-
dition of his work also as “slicing up corpuses” and thus resonant with his 
father’s profession as a butcher; the images of his father’s butcher shop 
filled with “basins of blood,” the floor “littered with hooves,” and its rela-
tionship to the violence of Jesus’ crucifixion; or the Good Friday rendition 
of the crucifixion, during which he “vomited gratefully”? A sense of dis-
gust or, perhaps, a longing to provoke disgust—possibly so we share his 
experience, faint with him in the church—certainly structures that book 
no less than the Gospel of John. As for me, I’ve written two books on 
trauma and loss, so on the question of penchants for certain affective 
states, I’m hardly less guilty than he is. (Kotrosits 2014b: 1–2)
The disjoint between Stephen’s affective reading of John and my own experi-
ence of John might push one to consider the more procedural, might we say 
methodological, question: How do things make one feel? Not just “what” does 
one feel or why, but what is the machinery, or magic, by which one is moved? 
Stephen had used the work of film theorist Eugenie Brinkema. Her book The 
Forms of the Affects (2014) was something of an outlier in its approach to affect. 
But Stephen appreciated it for its exegetical possibilities, possibilities that, by 
his own account, were hard to cull from most other texts falling under “affect 
theory.”44 
Brinkema seeks a “post-spectator” reading (of film) that challenges the 
“expressivity hypothesis” by which affect represents a communication between 
44   As Stephen writes, “I begin this time with a different book, the book on affect theory for 
which I have, in fact, been waiting. Eugenie Brinkema’s The Forms of the Affects
 
addresses 
a question that has perplexed me this past year or two: Can affect theory yield strategies 
for textual analysis, even for close reading? This may sound like a strange question to ask 
in the context of an SBL panel made up of people who have all already published affective 
analyses of biblical texts . . .” (2014b: 4).
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film and viewer. She is both “reading for forms” and “reading affects as having 
forms,” and suggests that it is “only because one must read for it that affect 
has any force at all” (2014: 37–38). With a patently polemical tone, Brinkema 
seeks an account of affect that counters what she describes as a confessional, 
interiorizing, and almost histrionic reception of affect in film theory; a game in 
which, she says, “the most affected theorist wins” (2014: 32).
Brinkema uses the term “solipsistic” regularly to characterize these spec-
tacularly over-affected critics (a word and a worry that Stephen evoked in his 
paper as well). In what is an exceptionally narrow idea of how to reflect on or 
perform one’s subjectivity in one’s own writing, Brinkema wields a frustrated, 
almost anti-feminist rhetoric against the “touchy-feely” dimensions of affect 
theory. Gosh, can’t we just get back to the “real business” of what things say 
instead of all this personal reflection? Brinkema seems to complain. “The turn-
ing to affect in the humanities does not obliterate the problem of form or rep-
resentation,” Brinkema writes (2014: xiv). This is undoubtedly true. But that 
statement also clearly mischaracterizes so much of affect theory’s relationship 
to representation, particularly the work of Cvetkovich, Ahmed, and Sedgwick 
and others who aren’t working in the Deleuzian vein. Sedgwick, for instance, 
wants to expand the way we think about what and how things might mean in 
order to avoid “reifying or mystifying” linguistic kinds of meaning (Brinkema 
2014: 6). (One would think that that could have helped Brinkema’s project of 
film analysis.) If, as Stephen notes, Brinkema enables exegetical readings better 
than other kinds of affect theory texts, it is in part because the very term exege-
sis implies a recourse to the “truth” of texts, a truth recoverable largely through 
proper diagnosis of its form and structure.
Stephen’s recourse to straightforward reading strategies and his implicit 
desire to return to formalist readings was a distinct departure from so much of 
what he had published before. One might wonder: is this the same person who 
so brilliantly skewered the field in The Invention of the Biblical Scholar?
Methodology is what is meant to maintain the dividing partition between 
sermon and scholarship, and prevent the lecturer’s podium from morph-
ing into a pulpit. The homily has long been the constitutive other of bib-
lical criticism, in other words, and methodology the enabling condition 
of such criticism—“methodology” here being a cipher for “objectivity,” 
“neutrality,” “disinteredness,” and all of the other related and founda-
tional values of biblical studies as an academic discipline. These values 
are rarely trumpeted these days . . . but continue to hold sway, seemingly, 
over most practitioners of the discipline anyway. . . . But our quarantining of 
the biblical-critical from the homiletical has not occurred without a cost. 
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Most obviously, our obsession with method has made for a mountainous 
excess of dull and dreary books, essays, and articles: here, first, in numb-
ing dry detail is my method; now watch and be amazed while I apply 
it woodenly to this unsuspecting biblical text. (Moore and Sherwood 
2011: 40–41)45
But speaking on a purely methodological level: how does one read for affect 
without themselves being affected? What organs of perception are being 
engaged to treat a text or image in such an aloof fashion? How might one 
relate to an image, a word, a phrase, on its formal level without the subtext 
of the viewer’s or reader’s affective disposition or the sense one gets from a 
text? Despite her theorizing on affect, Brinkema might be said to be reinvest-
ing in the Cartesian project of cognition as over and above, and vehemently 
separate from, emotion. Poised on a thin line between the cutting edge and 
something almost retrograde, Brinkema seeks an account of affect “without 
bodies,” emblematized by her reading of the famous shower scene in Psycho, 
finding not a tear on the face of Marion, but a “lachrymal drop”; an ambivalent 
form not belonging to Marion, but rather a “stark little star” set against the cold 
white tile of the bathroom (Brinkema 2014: 21).
Contra Brinkema, though, how one understands something—how some-
thing “makes sense”—doesn’t necessitate a model of naïve expressiveness, 
intentionality, or communication between text (or film) and reader (or viewer). 
One might well say Brinkema’s intervention itself reduces the reading process 
to the reader and what’s being read; it’s just an unfeeling reader she posits. But 
the ways in which we are moved by things is more than a one-way, or even two-
way street. It is not only a multi-sensory experience; it is a many-dimensional 
45   In fact, in his own (co-authored) introduction to the issue of Biblical Interpretation dedi-
cated to affect theory, he and Jennifer Koosed write,
   [A]ffect theory does not yield a ‘method’ in the standard biblical scholarly sense of 
the term. . . . Understandably unaware of how theory has tended to function in biblical 
studies, Seigworth and Gregg ask: “Isn’t theory—any theory with or without a capital 
T—supposed to work this way? Operating with a certain modest methodological vitality 
rather than impressing itself upon a wiggling world like a snap-on grid of shape-setting 
interpretability?” Into the wiggling worlds of biblical texts—narrative world, reception-
historical worlds—these six affect-oriented articles descend. Whether they are equipped 
with snap-on grids of shape-setting interpretability or more delicate writ(h)ing instru-
ments capable of matching the shape-shifting movements of these wiggling worlds and 
words, we leave the reader to judge” (Koosed and Moore 2014: 387).
   Indeed.
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experience that includes not only the text and the reader as part of a signifying 
process, but questions of history and materiality, and neither history nor mate-
riality are cloudless or easily decipherable categories. They, too, must be “read.” 
By history, as it should be clear by now, I mean not simply “what happened” 
as much as the uncertain traces of pasts, the forces of impingement—both 
those deemed more “personal” and those deemed more “collective”; from 
quirky and highly individualized wisps of association that are evoked by a text, 
to the political and ideological impositions or histories of interpretations that 
erupt into readings we might figure as “our own.” Materiality is no obvious or 
calculable category either. How the book feels in my hand, my impression of 
its cover, its font—or in the case of the Bible, its heft, its gold embossed letters, 
the familiar and thin paper, or even its heavy presence in U.S. politics and, 
say, one’s parents house, that enter the mix of how any given content reads 
or feels to us. Language, too, has a textural unevenness that “feels different” 
depending on what other bodies or histories come into contact with it. The 
Bible as material object is, as Stephen suggested in his paper, already mixed up 
in our materiality. It is also mixed up in many uncertain histories, those both 
more and less our own. Despite so much of Stephen’s work which speaks to the 
highly-affected contrary, his use of affect theory, at least in this paper, reduces 
it to interpretive exigency and momentary fascination: in short, a fad. 
But reading with attention to affect is considerably less interesting or 
important as a shiny new mode of truth production around texts than a way 
of getting in touch with how impressionistic all our readings and perceptions 
of texts and their elements actually are, whether or not those readings engage 
affect specifically. Impressionistic isn’t an insult or a limit—I actually think our 
subjectivity, ranging from our highly variable moods and dispositions to our 
sense of history in its idiosyncratic detail and disconcerting nebulousness, can 
surface important dimensions of texts. I just think it usually does so in a way 
that’s at odds with, or at least to the side of, our strivings:
Attending to affect is, or at least can be, a way of asking critical questions 
about contemporary motives and investments in texts and practices, 
of disabling the distancing techniques that are the bread and butter of 
enlightenment modes of critique—and our discipline in particular—in 
favor or the tender admittance that, yes, I feel something, whatever it is, 
when I read this, and that is emphatically about me, but also about the 
forces and histories that form me, about the collectivities that claim me 
and that I perhaps claim back. It is the recollection that meaning is a 
deeply subjective, textural, volatile enterprise that nonetheless yields 
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moments worthy of particular analysis, even if that analysis risks being 
unhinged into the oblivion of relativity—or, shall we say, solipsism. 
(Kotrosits 2014b: 4)
The combination of Stephen’s disruption (as the male senior scholar invited 
by other male scholars) of the homosocial scene of affective history-making, 
and his reading of affect against some of its constitutive epistemology, hints at 
the field’s aggression toward both real change and women’s collaboration and 
contributions. His interest in affect as another trend may even hollow it of its 
urgency as expressed by so many of my close colleagues-in-crime. And what 
for? Why did Stephen care about affect? Phil Harland, a dear colleague whose 
work on the social history of early Christianity found its way into affect theory 
through my book’s integration, attended that session out of curiosity. After the 
papers had all been read, he raised his hand, stood up, and self-effacingly posed 
a question to Stephen: “I don’t know anything about affect theory,” he said, “so 
I might just be totally ignorant.” A few people in the room chuckled. “But what 
is the point of talking about affect and ancient texts? To find out what the origi-
nal authors were feeling?” Stephen, holding tight to his poststructuralist guns, 
smiled wryly: “No.” But he then sat in suspended silence. He had no answer to 
“what is the point.”
Of course my longings for the subjective to appear more concertedly in 
biblical studies has a direct relationship to Stephen’s many beautiful writing 
experiments doing just that, as well as to his many stringent, hilarious critiques 
of the guild. Indeed it is with a debt to Stephen that I can even say that the 
disgust Stephen feels and the trauma and loss I sense in so much biblical lit-
erature may or may not tell us the “truth” about the texts we read, at least in 
any narrow or traditional sense. But where, one might ask, was the Stephen for 
whom the cold application of exegetical method was a joke, and for whom the 
text was a body indecipherable from his own?
“We are knit into texts, and their affectivity is ours,” I wrote, “not because we 
have projected our feelings onto them as if they are passive recipients of our 
affectivity, though, or because we have unmediated experience of their sense-
making, as if texts are bodies that themselves are unaffected by our touching 
of them.” I concluded: 
To draw from Jane Bennett’s understanding of “affect” in Vibrant Matter 
(2010) as a quality of all material life: a text’s very capacity to make sense 
is linked to the way in which it makes contact with us, or the way in 
which it collides with the wider atmosphere or elements of any given 
moment. Its composition, the materiality of its meaning, is altered with 
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the strange accruals of time; and, of course, it is altered with our touch, 
even as that contact magnetizes and reassembles parts of us through the 
very interaction. In fact Jane Bennett’s book, Vibrant Matter, is subtitled 
“A Political Ecology of Things,” and perhaps the phrase “political ecology” 
may be useful to remind ourselves that affect is neither “here” nor “there” 
but in the complicated knots between people, objects, forces, and all 
kinds of other things. Affect is indeed “more than a feeling,” but—to allay 
any fears of solipsism, Stephen—its “more” is tied ineluctably to the fact 
that our feelings are about a whole host of things other than us, anyway. 
(Kotrosits 2014b: 4)
 Part 4: “I Do Feel Things about Inscriptions” (Objects, Materiality, 
Experience)
Touching evokes perceptual openness and a relationality that confounds 
dualistic notions of interiority and exteriority, even as it also is the sense 
that most viscerally marks the boundaries of our bodies. The sensory and 
affective multivalence of touch makes it an expansive and slippery sort of 
metaphor even as (and/or because) it is grounded in experiences of 
material embodiment, with all its concrete possibilities of sturdiness and 
fragility (Waller 2013: 5)
Alexis’ thesis, Touching Philip (2013), observes the way images of texture and 
craft-related material processes lend meaning to the Gospel of Philip, but also 
the way metaphors of texture and touch work in scholarship on Philip. 
The Gospel of Philip’s fragmentary feel has led to debate about whether 
it is a collection of diverse, loosely knit textual strands or, rather, a uni-
fied composition with an underlying narrative and theological coherence 
waiting to be decoded. Some scholars contend that Philip is a collection 
of sayings compiled from diverse and sometimes conflicting sources; oth-
ers argue that it is a composition by a single author with a coherent theo-
logical point of view; and yet others suggest something in between, for 
instance, a tightly knit collection edited by a redactor or redactors with 
clear intentions. (Waller 2013: 6)
Reading Sedgwick’s Weather in Proust (2011), which contains Sedgwick’s reflec-
tions on how her own artistic interest in textiles informs her non-dualistic, 
non-identitarian, and non-narrative epistemologies, Alexis notices how limited 
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our epistemological resources are for understanding Philip’s lack of narrative 
coherence. What if, Alexis proposes, we took Philip seriously as a collection, 
as an archive, for which narrative coherence was not a criterion for meaning 
at all? 
In “Making Things, Practicing Emptiness,” Sedgwick describes her own 
love of textiles and her love of making things with her hands as a counter-
point to making theories through language and thought. But she also sets 
about imagining “language and thought as a medium, one with texture 
and materiality, comparable to other artistic media, that can be manipu-
lated through various processes to show new aspects.” Feeling and nar-
rative are linked: to perceive texture is to reach out and touch, which 
means also to be “immersed in a field of active narrative hypothesizing.” 
Questions scholarship asks of the text are often like the questions we ask 
of a texture we are in the act of perceiving: not only, as Sedgwick imag-
ines, do we ask “What is it like? nor even just How does it impinge on 
me?” but also “How did it get that way? and What could I do with it?” 
(Actually, I think most biblical scholarship generally preferences “How 
did it get that way?” over the other the questions Sedgwick asks.) So, what 
if we treat texts (in a sense) like textiles? What if we interrogate texts in 
(imaginatively) tactile ways? (Waller 2013: 6)
So much of this thesis entertains questions of touch alongside issues of intrac-
tability (materials that don’t do what we want them to, such as the difficulty of 
translation) and attachment (what we want out of our sources, why we keep 
coming back to them). One of the most memorable lines in this thesis is the 
very first one: “Sometimes I just love things for a long time before I understand 
why I’m drawn to them” (Waller 2013: 4).46
Alexis’s thesis prompts me to consider the affectivity in the “material turn” 
in biblical studies—the renewed interest in architecture, codex fragments, 
manuscript variations, visual representation, and epigraphic culture. Laura 
Nasrallah’s book Roman Responses to Christian Art and Architecture (2011) is 
one engagement of the material turn in biblical studies. In it, she mildly chides 
the fields of early Christian studies and classical studies for not engaging each 
other’s respective focuses on literary texts and visual and material culture. “We 
have not been able to recognize how themes such as power, justice, piety, and 
culture and part of far-ranging ancient conversations that are manifest not 
46   It is a thoroughly Freudian recognition: we do not always know what it is in the beloved 
that we love.
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only in literature but also in archaeological remains,” she writes (2011: 8). “We 
are like blindfolded people in the fable who surround and touch the elephant, 
each characterizing the object of his or her interest according to limited knowl-
edge. The elephant’s side is a wall, the leg is a tree, the trunk is a snake, the tusk 
a spear, the ear a fan, the swinging tail is a rope” (Nasrallah 2011: 8). She later 
explains her analogy: “Of course, by reading Christian and non-Christian texts 
together, and by bringing together both literary and archaeological remains, 
my own reconstruction of the second century cannot entirely capture the ele-
phant that we, blindfolded by the limits of our sources and methods, touch. All 
of our historical reconstructions are provisional and partial, and all inevitably 
and happily the best attempts of our imaginative enterprise” (2011: 9). History 
is something we can touch, but something we can never see. In this analogy, 
history is an object of imagination cultivated through tactile experience. 
What is it about these materials that we find so attractive? I find myself 
interested in ancient inscriptions and epigraphic culture as of late, as well. 
(“Interest”: the blandest of intellectual euphemisms.) I came to be attached to 
inscriptions through Phil Harland. As a social historian (but not, he cautions, 
a social scientist), Phil has doggedly cast his own work in empirical terms. 
History and theology for him are absolutely separable enterprises: he deals 
in “evidence.” And yet despite our basic differences, so many of his scholarly 
mediations have been, like mine, ones that ferret out other scholars’ invest-
ments. Indeed both of us seek less exceptionalist historical narratives about 
“early Christianity.” His entire body of work places the people we call “early 
Christians” as full and ordinary participants in the social structures and poli-
tics of the ancient Mediterranean: they had no special characteristics or poli-
tics, and virtually no distinct practices (e.g., Harland 2003; 2009). His interest 
in diasporic populations in the ancient Mediterranean enabled my applica-
tion of diaspora theory, though his take on diaspora focuses on the thorough 
assimilation of diasporic people in the Greco-Roman world rather than their 
disjoint or disillusionment. But I have ribbed him repeatedly on his recourse 
to “data” and other cold, informational, objectivist terms. His slipping into the 
affect session was a gesture of curiosity and characteristically good will toward 
a set of ideas—and perhaps a colleague—with which he agreed broadly but, 
he confessed, he didn’t know quite what to do with. 
His stubborn insistence on the compartmentalization of theology and his-
tory, and my stubborn hyper-integration of them; his emphasis on the cozy 
assimilation of “Christians”/Judeans in the Greco-Roman world and my 
emphasis on the social traumas inherent in diaspora conditions, has meant 
we’re intrigued readers of each other’s work. But it also means that we’re con-
stantly sending each other articles and books to coax each other along in each 
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other’s direction or, alternately, to demonstrate that we have been successfully 
coaxed. Phil had just recently finished two book projects on inscriptions in 
Asia Minor, and following the affect session in San Diego, he sent me an article 
on affect and inscriptions by classicist Angelos Chaniotis (2013). I quickly read 
it, and noting Chaniotis’s conclusion, one that carefully delineates his interest 
in affect as purely historical, I replied via email: 
I don’t know if you read it, but I like his approach in merging ques-
tions of affect, social bodies, and public life. (That last paragraph of the 
article is a funny kind of disclaimer, though: WE SHALL NOT SEEK 
UNDERSTANDING ABOUT EMOTIONS THEMSELVES.) 
The article met up with—maybe even triggered?—some initial reading I had 
been doing on ancient and contemporary ruin-gazing and ancient laments for 
fallen cities. A few months later I sent Phil an outline for my next monograph, 
tentatively entitled “Sovereignty in Ruins,” which included some fragmentary 
reflections on contemporary scholarship’s love of the artifact. I thanked him 
for bringing his social historian’s eyes to it, and joked that my reading of his 
book outlines would probably be something like, “But Phil, how do you feel 
about the inscriptions?” He replied to my quip with a smile icon and then 
wrote, among other things, “I do feel things about inscriptions, especially the 
epitaphs of kids.”
 Maybe our attraction to material culture is not just a fetishization of the 
past, at least in any simple or romanticized sense. There is, of course, some-
thing satisfyingly touchable about inscriptions (though I have probably only 
once actually touched one). Maybe it is that their concrete specificity gives 
some texture to that relatively abstract concept of death, or that even more 
abstract concept of history. Or maybe we just love that there is something to 
hold onto, something that, against the odds, remains: the ephemera of lives 
rendered into an impression, a mark on a stone. They are palpable signs of the 
past that touch and move us, even if we cannot, or at least generally do not, 
touch them.
There are few things more evocative and, I would add, socially expedient, 
than ruins. They evoke nostalgia, fascination, a sense of adventure, melan-
choly, and longing, among other things. Indeed ruins may actually be a fertile 
metaphor for theorizing affect, as Yael Navaro-Yashin has suggested (2009). 
Noting the tendency of cultural theory to enact its radicality by tossing old 
paradigms aside in favor of new ones (trends!), itself a particular form of ruin-
ation, Navaro-Yashin wants to resist the Deleuzian framework’s opposition of 
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the rhizome to the root—one that contrasts the flat, mobile, horizontal land-
scape of surfaces (the “plateau” of A Thousand Plateaus [Deleuze and Guattari 
1987]) against the vertical, discursive field and grid of subject-location. In other 
words, for Navaro-Yashin, Deleuzian theory’s turn away from the subject and 
towards non-human agents and a “cartographic” imagination—as Nigel Thrift 
(2000: 220) terms it—toward assemblages and ecologies is shortsighted: 
Rather than casting the roots against rhizomes, through my preferred 
metaphor of “the ruin,” I would like to suggest another kind of orienta-
tion. We said that the root is vertical, whereas the rhizome is horizon-
tal. The ruin, however . . . is both and neither. A ruin is rhizomatic in the 
sense that it grows in uncontrollable and unforeseen ways. . . . But a ruin 
is also about roots, because it is sited as a “trace” of a historical event, it is 
remembered, it is kept, lamented, and cherished in the memory of those 
who left it behind, it is sited and noticed by those who uncannily live in it or 
in its vicinity, it leaves marks in the unconscious. (Navaro-Yashin 2009: 14)
She borrows and fills out Bruno Latour’s object-oriented philosophy (2005a) in 
an ethnographic account the Turkish-Cypriot relationships to the abandoned 
homes and objects of Greek-Cypriots during the war of 1974. She articulates a 
“thingliness of politics,” in which affect is understood both in terms of land-
scape and in subjective terms: 
Paradigm-setting has cast subjectivity against affect, as if one cancels the 
other and as if one had to choose between camps of theoretical approach: 
a subject-centred or an object-orientated one. But neither the ruin in my 
ethnography, nor the people who live around it are affective on their own 
or in their own right, but both produce and transmit affect relationally. 
(Navaro-Yashin 2009: 14)
The horizontal versus the vertical—or the “flat” verses the “deep”—is an oppo-
sition also made in what Heather Love deems “the descriptive turn,” which 
(again, following Latour) resists the inherent humanist orientation, despite 
all claims to the contrary, in the linguistic turn’s faith in the endless richness 
and profundity of the text (Love 2010). Love suggests that “at the intersection 
of sociology and literature is a turn away from the singularity and richness 
of individual texts and a concomitant refusal of the ethical charisma of the 
literary translator or messenger” (2010: 374). She cites Franco Moretti, for 
instance, who produces a strong sociological critique of the literary value of 
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close reading, which he calls a “theological exercise,” opposing it with “distant 
reading,” that defines itself in distinctly empirical terms: scientific knowledge, 
authority (Love 2010: 374). 
Love herself takes a more moderate approach, wondering about the 
“possibilities for a method of textual analysis that would take its cue from 
observation-based social sciences including ethology, kinesics, ethnometh-
odology, and microsociology” (Love 2010: 375). These are fields which have 
“practices of close attention, but, because they rely on description rather than 
interpretation, they do not engage the metaphysical and humanist concerns 
of hermeneutics” (Love 2010: 375). We can and should, according to Love, find 
modes of reading that are “close but not deep.” 
I first came to this essay because Brock Perry, a theology doctoral student 
at Drew Theological School, suggested that my book on the Gospel of Mark 
(Kotrosits and Taussig 2013) was an example of this close but not deep reading. 
After reading Love’s article, I found this both flattering and surprising, since I 
would probably describe myself as something of an unrepentant humanist. 
But Love’s essay intrigued me for the conversation it staged between literary 
theory and sociology, two disciplines that register as different ends of the bibli-
cal studies spectrum. (I promptly sent it to Alexis and Phil.) While Love’s essay 
doesn’t bring up affect or affect theory, it does triangulate my repeated contrast 
between the affective and the empirical, and it thus offers a way to mediate 
what seem to be some intractable differences in values across the field of bibli-
cal studies. 
Love evokes a contrast between Clifford Geertz and his “thick description,” 
a favorite term of the social historians I know, and Erving Goffman’s refusal of 
questions of experience, seeing a compatibility between Latour and Goffman. 
Following Latour, Love values a “constructive sociology [which] aims to show 
‘what the real world is really like,’ ” but she is clear that no description is pure 
and devoid of interpretation:
As much as this project might seem to return to a naïve empiricism, 
Latour insists that empiricism is inadequate as a means for accounting 
for the world. He writes, “Empiricism no longer appears as the solid bed-
rock on which to build everything else, but as a very poor rendering of 
experience. This poverty, however, is not overcome by moving away from 
material experience, for instance to the ‘rich human subjectivity,’ but 
closer to the much variegated lives materials have to offer.” (Love 2010: 377)
Love’s search for a mode of description that is not a phenomenology—that 
eschews experience for not just the real, but also the really real—feels like a 
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friendlier (more compelling, less cynical or polemical) version of Brinkema’s 
fear of solipsism. It’s friendlier because it comes from an earnest longing to 
make contact with the world, and the textural language in her quote from 
Latour reminds me of Alexis’s thesis: he/she wants to be “closer to the much 
variegated lives materials have to offer.” Of course, the reading and historical 
practices associated with empiricism and other more objectivist modes of anal-
ysis have always been critiqued as ways of trying to get out of oneself; to evade 
the subjective. (I’ve just landed this critique above, in fact.) But Alexis’s thesis, 
especially alongside Laura Nasrallah’s elephant analogy, might invite the fol-
lowing consideration: what if the concertedly descriptive, non-hermeneutical 
impulses in what are typically empiricist or objectivist modes of analysis are 
understood more sympathetically, as (sometimes) a kind of reaching out? The 
materialist turn, the affective turn, the descriptive turn: one place where these 
revolutions converge is in texture, and thus in the sense of touch, in the thickly 
valenced curiosity—the wonder, the fascination, the attraction—in the ques-
tion: how do things feel? 
Strikingly, Love’s prime example of a text that exhibits this value of “close 
but not deep” is Toni Morrison’s Beloved (1987), and particularly the scene in 
which Beloved is murdered, in which the narrative occasionally (but not uni-
versally) takes on a “blankly descriptive point of view that is ascribed to no 
one in particular”—a “purely descriptive” or “neutral” perspective alternating 
with the “rapacious, dehumanizing” perspective of the slave catcher in the 
scene (Love 2010: 384–85). There is a “documentary aesthetic” to Beloved, Love 
argues, and “reading Beloved at the surface allows us to see Morrison’s project 
as registering the losses of history rather than repairing them” (Love 2010: 386). 
A lot could be made of this example. For instance, what if we think of the “flat” 
description not as “neutral” but as the affect of the traumatized? Who is the 
presumed recipient of this account of history, for whom are these losses regis-
tered? Is this not also concertedly humanist?47
47   I wonder if it mattered that over the time I was writing this article, I was embroiled in 
a six-month intensive introduction to mindfulness practice and meditation, which pro-
duced a series of consciousness changes, including an ability to more often “see things as 
they are.” My distrust of the pretense of the phrase “seeing things as they are,” paired with 
the real sense of attentiveness that experience accompanied, likely enabled my obser-
vation about the longing to “reach out” and make contact with the material world and 
all of its variegated glory that I see in Heather Love’s essay. But my new investment in 
loosely Buddhist practice also finds precedent or compatibility in Sedgwick’s later work: 
she wrote about Buddhist teachings and practice in relation to art and non-identification 
(e.g. Sedgwick 2011: 69–122). Alexis’s use of Sedgwick 2011 for its theorization of texture 
and touch likewise carries the subtext of attraction to Buddhist practice: Alexis has been 
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In another corner of biblical studies, as I recently discovered, there were 
others working at the intersection of feeling things and the empirical, one of 
whom is Colleen Shantz. Colleen had been working on affect from a cogni-
tive science perspective, and asking affective questions about Paul, as well as 
about what we call “religious experience” (2009; 2012; 2013). She is a Canadian 
colleague of Phil’s (he introduced us), but I had not heard of her work on emo-
tion. I presume that is because it didn’t show up on the cultural theory radar on 
which affect has been registered. 
Although within biblical studies “affect theory” has almost universally meant 
the cultural theory instantiation (thus devoid of any sticky entanglements 
with the sciences), since its ostensible founding with Massumi and Sedgwick/
Frank, affect theory has always had a kind of creative friction or curious entan-
glement with scientific/scientistic, empirical, and objectivist discourses—dis-
courses stereotypically aligned with one another. While Massumi theorizes the 
empirical as palliative, he nonetheless bemoans the stubborn refusal of the 
sciences and the humanities to speak to each other, and on numerous occa-
sions in his book engages biological and cognitive science experiments (not 
uncritically) to ground his own theorizing of affect. In Sedgwick and Frank’s 
reading of Tomkins, they too, express a confounded exhaustion with cultural 
theory’s broad skepticism of the kinds of scientism one finds in Tomkins: 
If anything, his scientism seems to interpret as an alternative and far 
coarser scientism the theory that would find his so easy to dismiss. The 
scientism of “theory,” indeed, can become visible in this light as a dif-
ferent product of almost the same, very particular technical moment as 
Tomkins’s. The fact that one, today, sounds cockamamie and the other 
virtual common sense . . . may reveal less about the transhistorical right-
bugging me for years to try meditation, usually to my scoffing resistance. Last I checked, 
Phil, too, is taking up mindfulness practice. “Sounds obvious but new to me,” he posted 
on Facebook the other day, “thoughts, judgments, and emotions just come and go. Watch 
them come, notice them, then let them go. No need to do anything about them.” And 
I wonder if it matters that my interest in mindfulness practice arose as a strategy for 
dealing with my own trauma-induced paranoia and anxiety; as well as a way of being at 
peace with what I initially experienced as an unbearable barrenness and sense of entrap-
ment in my new landscape of central Ohio, where the tender monotony of the Midwest 
meets the industrial ruins of the rust belt. This, too, may be obvious, but the question 
of “what’s lost” in this history of affect theory, and my attraction to the losses of history 
at large, are uncomfortably knit into the losses in my history—uncomfortable because I 
never seem to fully or precisely answer the question of “what’s lost” no matter how dog-
gedly I go at it.
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ness of “theory” than about the dynamics of consensus formation and 
cross-disciplinary transmission. (Sedgwick 2003: 94–95)48
Without having addressed much of the (cultural studies) affect theory canon, 
Colleen’s work shares Sedgwick’s and Massumi’s vexation at the humanities/
sciences divide. At SBL in the November following our introduction, I saw 
Colleen present on Romans 7:15–25, which begins, “I do not understand what 
I do. For what I want to do, I do not do, but what I hate to do” (Rom. 7:15). 
She read the passage for its “strong set of anthropological dualisms,” and as 
bespeaking a very physiological set of phenomena: the multiple, interactive, 
but incoherent systems that help produce human experience (Shantz 2015).49 
In other words, Paul speaks to, and from, “the parts into which we are split” 
(Shantz 2015). This “experience of fracturedness” that Paul describes in his lan-
guage of struggle between members (melos) and mind (nous), or between flesh 
(sarx) and spirit (pneuma), might be understood phenomenologically, or even 
simply in resonance with what cognitive science has theorized, as a “conflict 
among neural systems” (Shantz 2015). 
The exemplary instance of the fractured human, the struggle between parts 
of oneself, that Colleen chose? Love. Love arrives out of three neurological sys-
tems (sex drive/mating, attraction, and attachment/nesting), each of which 
developed separately but all are integrated only by the “I.” “No part of our 
brain sees what all the parts are doing,” Colleen observed (2015). Whether it be 
love or something else, the “I” arbitrates in decision-making between systems 
at odds with one another. In religious experience, Colleen suggested, the “I” 
becomes stronger. Thus, Paul’s “I” is the one who “knows best.” 
Colleen’s presentation was my foray into the cognitive linguistic wing of 
SBL, and to be honest, the rest of the session left me a little cold. I was struck 
not only by Colleen’s charisma, which simultaneously engaged and relaxed me 
(and perhaps the entire room), but also by what Colleen was speaking about; it 
was fascinatingly similar to themes and experiences so many of us in another 
corner of biblical studies have also theorized, though with psychoanalysis and 
cultural studies as our schemas: the internal incoherence of the subject and the 
place of the “I” (or, in Freudian language, the ego) in attempting to mediate or 
contain all those parts and pieces. In speaking about the history of scholarship 
on ecstatic experience, she characterized a familiar arc from essentializing/
48   Of course, Mel Chen’s Animacies (2012) and Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter (2010) also both 
stretch outside the expected humanities bias.
49   Quotations from Shantz 2015 are all based on my notes that I took during her oral presen-
tation at the 2015 SBL Annual Meeting.
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universalizing claims about these kinds of experiences to strong cultural con-
structivist modes (exemplified by Wayne Proudfoot 1985). For Colleen, who has 
biological science in her educational history, cultural constructivist approaches 
were an “overcorrection” and cognitive approaches engage some universal or 
“panhuman capacities,” but ones that “collide with culture” (Shantz 2015). 
Colleen uses cognitive science to recount the complexities of experience, on 
the many planes in which experience is grounded. Colleen, too, is attached 
to the materiality of human experience, the “thingliness” of the human—the 
human as feeling thing. I was likewise struck by Colleen’s suggestion that she 
had a theological interest—an interest in “meaning-making”—and her state-
ment that “theological readings don’t need to be imposed readings” (Shantz 
2015). Felt ones, impinged ones, but not imposed. 
 Part 5: What’s Lost? Biblical Studies and the (Im)Personal
The appearance of theories of affect in biblical studies, from my perspective, 
has less to do with any kind of trend in cultural studies than with how biblical 
studies has historically (and defensively) defined itself—as value-neutral read-
ing, impartial history, “legitimate” science, Eurocentric, and over-determined 
by male presumption—and the reverberations those definitions have in bibli-
cal studies to this very moment. Importantly, though, that is not to say that 
biblical studies itself is “fixed” by affect theory, especially since obviously affect 
theory can get caught up in some of those same values, histories, and presump-
tions. Theorizing affect does not save us from any of the usual self-deceptions 
or muscularities. But the other reason I hesitate to say that affect theory per-
forms some kind of “fix” for a broken discipline is that (it seems to me) those 
forms of reading and history that might engage stereotypically empiricist or 
value-neutral forms of knowing, ones which might seem to align with biblical 
studies as it has traditionally been defined, are sometimes imbued with highly 
affective or affected subjective/experiential negotiations, if not always overtly, 
as well as with a certain kind of sincerity of investment, a humility before the 
world and before others. If epistemological presumption can be found any-
where, so can epistemological modesty. 
In fact it turns out that there is no single or easily characterizable rela-
tionship between various forms of scientism and affect, affect theory, or the 
subjective—or, more generally, between “the empirical” and the “experiential.” 
They are rhetorical categories from the start, as Latour notes (2005b: 136–37). 
What changes about biblical studies, though, when we notice this? Hopefully, 
one effect might be a softening of rhetoric and scholarly self-identification with 
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single, ideologically defined systems of thought. Another effect, an important 
one, might be a willingness to notice the serious epistemological eclecticisms 
working across biblical studies—or, differently said, our intellectual incoher-
ence to ourselves, in which the “I” is constantly mediating and trying to con-
tain uncontainable experience (hi, Colleen), while at the same time we long to 
make contact with, to touch, something outside of ourselves.
I’ve often wondered how to express gratitude for a discipline both so 
enabling and so short-sighted. For me and so many other scholars I admire, the 
field’s refusals have also been its openings, at least under some circumstances, 
some of the time. What a relief that there is an impersonal historical or exe-
getical voice into which we can slip when the weight of claiming the personal 
on its own terms is too intense or the circumstances too uncongenial, even for 
those of us whose work has sought to loosen and transgress those distinctions. 
Many of us were drawn to the field for the chance for sideways or buffered 
engagement with especially searing injuries, attachments, and frustrations 
that took/take place in the vicinity of the Bible and under the heavy hand of 
a biblical culture. But our own exegesis and rigorous contextualizations fail us 
when they are most successful, leaving us with a sense of, well, something lost. 
But that is the strange landscape into which these iterations of affect theory 
erupted, as relief from relief, as it were, and as a sumptuous, creative, and rela-
tional space carved out in a discipline that gave even as it was taking away. 
Affect theory in all kinds of instantiations rings with the question of “what’s 
lost”—what’s lost in the linguistic turn, in our accounts of the nation, in our 
renderings of ideology at large or capitalism specifically? Where is our won-
der? Where is the mobility? What about the world or the body as such? Whose 
experiences don’t make the official register? Affect theory is neither the first 
nor the last set of theories to try to speak against disciplinary machineries, 
nor to attempt to ask what’s been lost to them. That is native to any kind of 
“turn”: an address to what is felt to be missing, what feels conspicuously or 
perniciously absent, an invocation of what we need and haven’t yet found. “All 
the new thinking is about loss,” Robert Hass once wrote, “In this it resembles 
all the old thinking” (1999: 4). Attending to affect does—or, at least, can do—
many things, but one of its most profound contributions is that it can help us 
move that subtext of loss to the foreground by privileging and giving a concep-
tual language for those potent and hazy experiences that are most basic and 
endemic to our living. Every theory, every story, may well have loss (or injury 
or fear or desire . . .) in it; talking about affect might help us better entertain 
those experiences in all their terrifying and unwieldy force, even to the point 
of being lost to them. For all that we’ve lost, though, attending to affect might 
be able to give us, if we can stand it, closer contact with the world in all its 
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gravel, in all its polychromatic forms of vitality, movement, and sensation. And 
therein lies the critical difference.
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